Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness
May 1, 2008
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
This paper examines the current level of central bank independence (CBI) and transparency in a broad sample of countries using newly constructed measures, and looks at the evolution in both measures from an earlier time period. Increases in CBI have tended to occur in more democratic countries and in countries with high levels of past inflation. More independent central banks in turn tend to be more transparent, while transparency is also positively correlated with measures of national institutional quality. Exploiting the time dimension of our data to eliminate country fixed effects and using instrumental variable estimation to overcome endogeneity concerns, we present evidence that greater CBI is associated with lower inflation. We also find that enhanced transparency practices are associated with the private sector making greater use of information provided by the central bank.
Subject: Banking, Central bank autonomy, Central bank transparency, Central banks, Exchange rate arrangements, Exchange rate flexibility, Foreign exchange, Inflation, Prices
Keywords: CBI index, Central bank autonomy, central bank independence, Central bank transparency, country sample, Exchange rate arrangements, Exchange rate flexibility, Global, independence measure, Inflation, inflation bias, inflation variability, monetary policy, regime variable, transparency, transparency practice, WP
Pages:
28
Volume:
2008
DOI:
Issue:
119
Series:
Working Paper No. 2008/119
Stock No:
WPIEA2008119
ISBN:
9781451869798
ISSN:
1018-5941
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