Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union

Author/Editor:

Elena Carletti ; Giovanni Dell'Ariccia ; Robert Marquez

Publication Date:

September 15, 2016

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

We explore the behavior of supervisors when a centralized agency has full power over all decisions regarding banks, but relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act. This institutional design entails a principal-agent problem between the central and local supervisors if their objective functions differ. Information collection may be inferior to that under fully independent local supervisors or under centralized information collection. And this may increase risk-taking by regulated banks. Yet, a “tougher” central supervisor may increase regulatory standards. Thus, the net effect of centralization on bank risk taking depends on the balance of these two effects.

Series:

Working Paper No. 16/186

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

September 15, 2016

ISBN/ISSN:

9781475536751/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2016186

Price:

$18.00 (Academic Rate:$18.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

50

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