The Internal Job Market of the IMF's Economist Program
October 1, 2004
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Summary
This paper shows how the internal job market for participants in the IMF Economist Program (EPs) could be redesigned to eliminate most of the shortcomings of the current system. The new design is based on Gale and Shapley's (1962) Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) and generates an efficient and stable outcome. An Excel-based computer program, EPMatch, implements the algorithm and applies it to the internal job market for EPs. The program can be downloaded from http://www.people.hbs.edu/gbarron/EPMatch_ for_Excel.html
Subject: Labor
Keywords: Africa, deferred acceptance algorithm, entry-level job market, eps exhibit, eps rank, eps' ranking, eps' ROLs, Gale-Shapley, market maker, marriage problem, Matching, preference matrix, rankings of department, rankings of the department, stability, transferring eps, WP
Pages:
28
Volume:
2004
DOI:
Issue:
190
Series:
Working Paper No. 2004/190
Stock No:
WPIEA1902004
ISBN:
9781451859690
ISSN:
1018-5941
