Work Absence in Europe
October 1, 2004
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
Work absence is an important part of the individual decision on actual working hours. This paper focuses on sickness absence in Europe and develops a stylized model where absence is part of the labor-leisure decision made by workers and the production decision made by profit-maximizing firms, with insurance provisions and labor market institutions affecting the costs of absence. The results from a panel of 18 European countries indicate that absence is increased by generous insurance schemes where employers bear little responsibility for their costs. Shorter working hours reduce absence, but flexible working arrangements are preferable if labor supply erosion is a concern.
Subject: Employment protection, Expenditure, Financial institutions, Insurance, Labor, Labor supply, Unemployment, Unemployment benefits
Keywords: absence rate, employment protection, Employment protection, Europe, Insurance, labor force, labor market, Labor supply, panel data, sick pay, sickness absence, sickness insurance, social insurance, Unemployment benefits, unemployment insurance, working time, WP
Pages:
44
Volume:
2004
DOI:
Issue:
193
Series:
Working Paper No. 2004/193
Stock No:
WPIEA1932004
ISBN:
9781451859843
ISSN:
1018-5941




