Transcript

Speakers:

Jihad Azour, Director of Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund

 

Moderator: 

Angham Al Shami, Communications Officer, International Monetary Fund 

 

AL SHAMI: Good morning and good afternoon to everyone joining us here and online.  I'm Angham AL SHAMI from the Communications Department here at the IMF and I will be your moderator for today.  

I'm pleased to be here, joined by Jihad Azour, Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, who will give us an overview of the regional economic for the region.  

But before I turn to Jihad, I want to remind you that we have interpretations in Arabic and in French online and as well as in the room.  

So, Jihad, the floor is yours.  

M AZOUR: Thank you, Angham.  Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining us at the 2025 Annual Meetings.  Before we move to your questions, let me share the latest economic outlook for the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan and the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Despite the year marked by trade tensions and regional conflict, the economies of the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan and the Caucuses in Central Asia have shown resilience.  Growth has held better than expected and the impact of higher U.S. tariffs and geopolitical tensions has been short-lived.  

Let me start briefly with the global picture.  Output growth has held steady, and inflation remained moderate or eased in most regions.  Some of the global economy's strength reflects temporary factors such as firm front loading, activity ahead of the tariff increases and adjusting inventories and supply chain, as well as significant investment in new AI technologies.  As these factors fade, global demand may soften, which could affect our regions through trade, finance, and commodity channels.  

Economic activity in the MENA region and Pakistan has been stronger than expected.  We now project growth of 3.2 percent in 2025, up from 2.1 percent in 2024, and higher than our April forecast.  Oil exporters have benefited from higher oil output following the faster unwinding of OPEC+ cuts.  Oil importers and Pakistan have gained from low energy prices, strong remittances, and a vibrant tourism sector, all supporting domestic demand.  Looking ahead, growth is expected to rise to 3.7 percent in 2026, while inflation should remain moderate, helped by lower food and energy prices and tight monetary policies.  

In the Caucasus and Central Asia, growth is also expected to be driven by strong consumption, credit expansion, and steady hydrocarbon exports.  We project average growth of 5.6 percent this year before easing gradually to about 4 percent over the medium term as hydrocarbon production stabilizes and fiscal consolidations take hold. 

Exchange rates have adjusted smoothly, sovereign spreads have narrowed, and several countries have successfully returned to international bond market.  Inflation, however, remains mixed, easing in most MENA economies and Pakistan, but accelerating and still elevated in many CCA countries due to robust demand and important price pressures.  

Overall, the outlook is positive but not without risks.  In MENA and Pakistan, growth should continue to strengthen, supported by reforms and resilient domestic demand.  In the CCA, growth will moderate to a more sustainable pace while inflation gradually declines.  

However, downside risks remain.  Significant recent shocks and still elevated global uncertainty could undermine demand and induce global economic slowdown or tightening global financial conditions.  Persistent inflation and concerns about fiscal sustainability in advanced economy could raise borrowing costs, especially for countries in our regions with large financing needs.  The region remains exposed to geopolitical tensions and climate-related shocks, which could disrupt activity.  On the upside, faster progress toward peace and reforms could yield stronger and more inclusive growth.  

Turning now to policy priorities.  The current momentum gives policymakers an opportunity to rebuild fiscal and external buffers, especially where reserves and fiscal space are limited.  To sustain growth and strengthen resilience, countries should first enhance fiscal frameworks to ensure long-term sustainability.  Second, reinforce monetary policy credibility to anchor inflation expectations.  And three accelerate structural reforms to diversify economies, empower the private sector, and attract investment that creates jobs. 

In conflict-affected countries, priority must include rapid macroeconomic stabilization, rebuilding institutions, and securing external support to enable recovery.  Beyond immediate risks, advancing reforms that could promote good governance, regional integration, and equal opportunity, especially for youth and women, will help transform today's resilience into a lasting prosperity.  

Let me also reaffirm the IMF's strong commitment to both regions.  We continue to support our members through policy advice, financing, and capacity development.  Since early 2020, the IMF has approved nearly $56 billion in financing for countries across MENOP and CCA.  We have also delivered more than 385 capacity-development projects across 31 countries totaling $36.8 million in fiscal year 2024 and 2025.  

We will explore, of course, these issues further at our Regional Economic Outlook launch in Dubai on October 21 and in Almaty in Kazakhstan, on October 30.  Both events are open to in-person or online participation, and I also invite you all to join us.  

In conclusion, I would like to say that the region has once again demonstrated its ability to weather shocks.  The task now is to turn short-term stability into long-term strength by building buffers, modernizing policy frameworks, and accelerating reforms that support inclusive and sustainable growth.  

This concludes my remarks.  Thank you very much for being with us today.  I look forward to your questions.  Angham, back to you.  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  Thank you very much, Jihad.  And now we will turn over to you for your questions.  

But before we do that, a couple of ground rules.  For those in the room, please raise your hand, and we will get to you.  And please identify yourself and your media outlet when we call upon you.  Please try to stick to one question.  We'll try to get as many questions as possible and we can come back to you.  For those joining us on Webex, please submit your questions via the Webex chat box or raise your hand and we will come to you.  

I will start with the room, but I'll actually start with regional questions.  And in fact, we did receive one question online that I'll start with -- and then I'll turn to the room if you have any additional questions, regional questions, and then we'll turn to country-specific issues.  

And the question that we got is: with the rise of global protectionist policies, what mechanisms can Gulf countries and the region, but particularly GCC countries, adopt to enhance intra-regional economic integration and attract global supply chains instead of relying solely on oil flows?  

Any additional questions, regional questions on the region?    

QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  My question is on the idea of debt in the GCC.  Saudi Finance Minister Mohammad Aljadaan was speaking earlier this week, warning about rising global debt levels.  So, could you just give me a sense of what risks you see for the Gulf, namely the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, if there is turbulence in the U.S. bond market and a softening in oil prices?  Thank you. MR. AZOUR:  Thank you very much.  Let me address the first question that is related to trade.  

First, the recent trade measures that were introduced in terms of tariffs so far in terms of direct impact have limited direct impact on countries in the region.  And this is due to various factors.  The most important one is the limited trade relationship between the U.S. and most of the countries in the region.  In addition, the tariff rates that finally were imposed were between 10 to 15 percent.  An important part of the export, which is the oil and gas, are excluded from the tariff measures. 

Therefore, the first impact is limited because of the limited level of tariff and also the relatively limited trade volume between the region and the U.S. However, one has to be careful about the indirect trade impact that could materialize over time with change in trade routes.  Therefore, countries need to remain vigilant and use those developments in order to strengthen their capacity to be more attractive for trade as well as also for diversifying their economies.  

And this is the second part of the questions.  And here I think I would like to highlight two facts.  One is over the last few years, countries in the Gulf have succeeded in gradually diversifying their economies and relying more on the non-oil sector, and over the last few years, the growth was mainly driven by those non-oil activities.  

The current landscape globally also provides, especially with the investment in AI and other fast-growing sector opportunities for countries in the region to accelerate their diversification and use some of those investment, large investment, in order to accelerate this economic transformation.  Opportunities to build new trade routes, new connectivities are there, be it with neighboring countries or with new regional partners.  And we have seen in the past few years more of those with other geographies like Africa, Central Asia, and recently also with Europe, with some trade agreements.  

The second question, your question, on the debt.  Well, first of all, access to that market has improved this year, and in terms of debt issuance so far, we have already exceeded the level of issuance that we had last year.  The improvements in market conditions, relatively, I would say stable financial markets, allowed many of the regional countries to regain market access.  The latest one was Kuwait with an issue of 11.5 percent.  In the case of the GCC, most of those countries have buffers, and therefore, accessing the market is a part of their asset liability management, and when market conditions are favorable, countries are benefiting from that.  Of course, this is something that all countries need to deal with carefully by strengthening their institutions.  

In terms of debt management, in terms of also liability management, what are the risks?  Well, we know what the risks are.  Most of the risks are related to the global trends in terms of demand and supply.  In terms of oil, we saw recently an increase in the oil supply with the unwinding of the OPEC+ Agreement, that has led to softening in the oil price.  Yet for oil-exporting countries, because of the increase in oil production, it has reduced, I would say the negative impact and in certain countries, it has helped in accelerating growth in 2025.  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  Thank you very much, Jihad.  And now we'll take the second round of questions, and we will start with the lady here in the front, please.  

QUESTIONER:  My question is about the economic reform program, for I would like to know about the progress Egypt has made in terms of empowering the private sector.  And also, we know that the first review of the Resilience and Sustainability Trust is supposed to happen soon.  I would like to know, Jihad, why are inflation rates are still persistent?  Thank you.  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  Any more questions on Egypt?  The gentleman here in the front.  

QUESTIONER: I have a question about the peace deal in Gaza and its impact on the Middle East, North Africa region, and particularly on the Egyptian economy, and how does the Fund see this will impact the macroeconomic indicators of Egypt.  The second point is the programs related to economic growth reforms, especially the sub-programs in terms of the resilience and sustainability trust programs, and other programs from the EU.  Are you thinking about extending the duration of the current program for Egypt that it has signed with the IMF in order to give a bigger space to carry out the reforms that are needed, especially that now we are in a phase that is impacting the Egyptian people.  Thank you.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much.  Any more questions on Egypt?  And please try to keep it to one question.  And I think we have a question online on Egypt, so maybe we could turn online.  

AZOUR: You are muted.  Maybe you could unmute yourself.  

QUESTIONER: Sorry.  Thank you.  I think my question was already asked in the room, which is if you're able to provide any update on the timing of the Fourth -- of the Fifth and Sixth Reviews, and what specific reforms, particularly on privatization, what progress you're looking to see from the Egyptian authorities in order to be able to approve those reviews.  

My second question is on Lebanon.  I could ask it now or I could hold it.  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  We'll come back to Lebanon.  Thank you.  

QUESTIONER: Thank you.  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  Over to you, Jihad.  

AZOUR: Okay, maybe I can answer the first question in Arabic, and then I will take also what she asked.  

Concerning the economic situation in Egypt.  The Egyptian economy has shown improvement. Tangible improvements in the past two years since the program was implemented, the program that aims to improve the macroeconomic indicators.  We saw inflation decline and we hope that next year it will reach 11.8 percent which is a decrease compared to the previous years.  And also, there was an improvement in growth rates where growth rates for this year, for the financial year 2024, 2025 will reach 4.3 percent, and for the next year it will -- 2025-2026 -- it will be [4.5] percent the growth rate.  And also, we are seeing an improvement in debt levels that are gradually decreasing compared to the previous years.  

In reality, the program has made progress in terms of achieving economic stability.  And as you know, the program is founded on main pillars, which is to support the growth process and create job opportunities by empowering the role of the private sector.  And that requires many points.  First of all, improving the business environment.  Second, giving a bigger space to the Egyptian economy and the private sector by reviewing the state's role in this field.  And here, we require the state's role to be supportive and not competitive by laying a clear strategy for the role of the private sector, and also for the transformation of public institutions, and to raise the level of investment.  All of these points have been a part of the consultations between the Egyptian government's team that is currently here and the IMF staff, and build accordingly.  We will determine the time frame for the IMF's mission to visit Egypt for the Fifth and Sixth Review.

Regarding extending the duration of the program, in reality, it's not necessary to extend it.  We are still working on it and we are working on facilitating two axes.  First of all, accelerating the role of the private sector and protecting Egypt from any turbulences, and protecting the social system.  This is very important by transforming parts of the public expenditure to be more targeted and provide more support for the most vulnerable categories through targeted policies, and by creating a bigger space of the public expenditure to support the most vulnerable.  

As for the implications of the Gaza peace deal on Egypt and the region, your question is important without a doubt.  First of all, the countries in the region were able to adapt to the (economic) shocks.  In the past two years, the countries of the region suffered a lot of geopolitical and economic shocks and that adversely affected them.  However, neighboring countries to Egypt, such as Jordan, were able to adapt to the shocks, and Egypt was also able to adapt to the shocks.  

The adverse effect on Egypt was on the trade volume, with the reduction of Suez Canal activity and an indirect impact on the tourism sector in one year.  In one year, because the volume of trade was reduced significantly, especially through the Red Sea and there was an adverse impact on the economy, however, we have seen that the economic activity level rebounded in Egypt.  This also applies to Jordan, which was able to adapt to the shocks, and the Jordanian economy continued its resilience and picked up slightly in its growth.  Any pickup, any improvement in the geopolitical situation will leave positive effects, and also enforcing or strengthening these expectations will allow for more economic adaptability and reforms, and help Egypt improve.  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  Thank you, Jihad.  We'll do another round of questions.  Maybe we'll go to the gentleman here in the front.  

QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Thank you, Director.  So my question is about Gaza.  There are currently different estimates.  What would it take to rebuild and reconstruct Gaza?  So, from the IMF standpoint, what is the most precise estimate about the cost and about the time frame for reconstruction?  And sticking to this topic, does the IMF have any plans whatsoever to take part directly, indirectly in providing or facilitating support for Gaza reconstruction?  Thank you so much.  

MS. AL SHAMI: Any other questions on Gaza?  Let's go to the lady in the front, please.  Thank you.  

QUESTIONER: Thank you, Angham.  Thank you, Jihad.   So it was a similar question on Gaza, as the gentleman has laid it out.  But given that the State of Palestine is not one of the 191 members, to what extent can a special program be put, just like the IMF has done previously with countries that have undergone catastrophes, whether natural disasters or other wars?  That's my question on Gaza.  

And I have another question, but on Tunisia, if possible.  Shall I give it now or later?  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  I'll come back to you on Tunisia.  

QUESTIONER: Alright, thanks.  

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much.  We'll have one more question, maybe on Gaza.  The gentleman here, please.  

QUESTIONER: Britain held a reconstruction conference and invited a number of investors.  Egypt also called for an international reconstruction conference.  Will the IMF have any role in these conferences?  Was the IMF invited even as an advisor?  These conferences, what will the IMF do about them?  Thank you.  

MS. AL SHAMI: We have another question on this topic.  

QUESTIONER: Good morning, everyone.  Hello, Jihad.  

AZOUR: Good morning.  Good afternoon.  

QUESTIONER: Good afternoon.  And thank you, Angham, for taking my question.  I have just one question on the oil importers.  You have just said, Jihad, that tourism and remittances boost the demand in the region.  So, could you please elaborate more on such topic because we wanted to know the impact of such a situation on the growth in the oil importers, including Egypt.  Thank you.  

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you.  I'll turn to you.  

AZOUR: Thank you very much.  I will start with the first set of questions on Gaza.  Of course, we strongly welcome the announcement of an agreement to secure a ceasefire.  The conflict has inflicted a heavy human toll and caused significant economic damage to the most directly affected areas.  

To answer the first question, the sequence usually in those cases is first, assess the damage and identify what are the emergency needs.  And those are parts of the activities that are done usually by UN agencies and the World Bank, who are currently assessing the level of damages, the immediate needs, and the recovery needs.  The Fund contributes in the international coordination framework that exists in the international community, within the context of our mandate.  As you know, we provide technical assistance.  We also provide policy advice, and we are part of the framework of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee that has been established back in 1994.

We look forward to seeing how the numbers will, you know, coming from this assessment, and what are the views of our sister institution, the World Bank, as well as also the UN agencies on that.  

On the question regarding conferences, we are not aware yet, but we have been regularly participating in the various events that yearly take place in the context of the UN General Assembly meetings, as well as also the other forums.

As per the question on the non-oil economies, or, sorry, the oil-importing economies, the 2025 main driver for growth was improvement in certain sectors like tourism, strong remittances.  Thanks also to the good performance in the oil exporting countries and the performance of a certain number of sectors that are country-specific, like agriculture in a certain number of countries or tourism.  The countries also during the year 2025 kept their effort to maintain inflation under control, which was successful in most of the countries, and also to make sure that fiscal situation also remain tight, especially for countries who have a high level of debt and they need to maintain and to preserve macroeconomic stabilization.  

Of course, a certain number of oil importing countries who have been going through conflict are currently in a process of emerging from those, like Lebanon, Syria, and others, unfortunately, are still suffering from conflict situations like Yemen or Sudan.  But broadly speaking, the improvement in the outlook for this year is moderate, which, despite the high level of uncertainty, allowed us to upgrade the outlook and increase it by 0.6 percent compared to our projections back in April.  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  Thank you, Jihad.  We'll take one question here in the room, please.  

QUESTIONER:  I have a question about Lebanon.  What are the main conditions for activating the program, and what is the volume of the program in Lebanon?  Also, dealing with reducing subsidies, the IMF criticized the drive to raise taxes on oil or fuel in -- I'm talking about Lebanon here.  Is the removing the Bank Secrecy Act in Lebanon a good step?  

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you.  The gentleman here in the front.  

QUESTIONER:  Based on the idea that illicit finance is a key contributor to political instability, and on that note, Lebanon is full of cash right now, it's a cash economy where there is no oversight, and there is a great debt to be repaid.  And I'm wondering, if requiring, the Bank of Lebanon to sell its gold reserves would sort of exacerbate the mistrust that creditors have, or debtor or depositors have sort of perpetuating the cash economy.  And also, the non-repayment of debt by the government to the Bank of Lebanon would that not also fuel mistrust within the depositors?  So again, fueling the cash economy.  And then keeping out of the sort of fiscal sort of income, all of the money that's in the cash economy, that's not going to the Fiscal Affairs Department.  Thank you.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much.  One more question on Lebanon.

QUESTIONER: Good morning.  In addition to the cash economy, we want to know what is the real problem preventing the ability to reach a program with the IMF?  What are the main impediments, particularly in terms of the distribution of losses, and what is actually needed in terms of the state, the Bank of Lebanon?  And what is your position on this issue?  

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you.  I'll take a few questions online, please.  

QUESTIONER:  Yeah, my question relates to the categorization of regular and irregular claims when it comes to the restructuring of the deposits in Lebanon's banking system.  How does the IMF define irregular claims?  Do you have any sense of how large those irregular claims could be and how should they be handled?  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  And we also received some online questions, a lot of questions, on Lebanon.  How do you evaluate the talks with Lebanese authorities and do you think they are ready to sign an agreement with the IMF to finalize a program?  

So, a number of questions on the status of the leveling of the program with Lebanon.  So, over to you, Jihad.  

AZOUR: Thank you very much.  I will address the questions in Arabic and then in English.  

In terms of the negotiations with Lebanon, Lebanon once again requested a program.  This request was made in March this year.  Talks between the Lebanese government and the IMF team started based on the program that was reached as an interim agreement in 2022, which depended on certain aspects.  First, the return to macroeconomic stability by addressing the debt issue, the banking sector, and also addressing the weak growth because of the high level of inflation.  

Several rounds of talks were held between the IMF and the Lebanese government.  The IMF team visited Lebanon a few weeks ago before the Fall Meetings.  This week, we are continuing the consultations with the Lebanese government on the main issues.  First, how to address the sequence of obligations and maintain the deposits, savings, the most vulnerable deposits, and also the hierarchy of claims.  There is a need to look into the government's fiscal reform to secure stability in the debt issue, which is a main issue.  And the measures needed to introduce structural reforms to enhance the economy and the role of the social safety net because of the severe decline in safety programs.  

And the whole question of trust.  Definitely in those cases, when you have a situation of default that has been, I would say, accumulating over at least the last six years, you need first to address the trust issue.  Addressing the trust issue is by dealing with the key issues.  One, debt sustainability.  Two, is the sustainability of the financial sector, which will bring confidence back.  By bringing confidence back and by reactivating the banking system, you will see a gradual shift from a cash economy to a more formal economy and will allow the financial sector to again play its role to finance the economy.  

Of course, this should be strengthened by measures to increase anti-money laundering and combating all illicit activities.  And this is also an important priority for Lebanon to regain access to the international financial market to correspondent banking.

To the question on what are the key fiscal measures, there is a need for medium-term fiscal frameworks that address the unsustainable fiscal situation in order to provide an anchor to the debt and gradually work on reducing the debt increase revenues, but in a broad base in order to reduce the burden on the low-income people.  Address the issue of inflation, which constitutes one of the major challenge, the most unfair tax for low-income people.  Therefore, the negotiation between the authorities and the team is ongoing.  And then, based on that, the team and the Fund will update the media on the progress.  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  Thank you, Jihad.  We'll go to questions in the room, and the lady at the front here, please.  

QUESTIONER:  Hello.  I'm from Kyrgyz Republic and I have two questions.  First, how do the global challenges outlined in REO affect Central Asian countries?  And how dangerous are these challenges for the region, and what can we do to reduce that?  Concerning that countries are really different, we have oil exporters, oil importers, low-income countries, and, of course, risks, consequences of their impact of the risk can be different.

And my second question is about my country.  How does the IMF assess Kyrgyzstan's public debt level?  Because Kyrgyzstan is actively increasing its domestic debt, how does this affect the country's debt sustainability and our economic growth?  And should this be considered a worrying trend?  

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much.  And we have one more question on CCA online.  

QUESTIONER: Am I coming through?  

MS. AL SHAMI: Yes, we can hear you.  Go ahead, Laman.

QUESTIONER: Can you hear me?  

MS. AL SHAMI: Yes, we can hear you.  Go ahead.  I think she can't hear us.  You can go ahead and ask the question.  

QUESTIONER: Alright.  So my question is about the recent trends in the energy market.  Given the underinvestment in the upstream oil and gas sector, how is it going to affect the macroeconomic situation in the Caucasus and Central Asian countries?  And what are your recommendations in order to mitigate as much as possible the negative impact of this trend?  Thank you.  

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much.  Any more questions on Central Asia and Central Asia?  Over to you, Jihad.  

AZOUR: Thank you very much.  The economic performance is still showing a strong resilience in 2025.  The average growth rate for the Caucasus and Central Asian countries remains strong at 5.6 percent this year, reflecting an upward revision of 0.7 percent compared to our projections back in the Spring Meetings.  

What explains this robust level of growth?  One, you have a solid domestic demand that has also been compounded by credit expansion and stable or stronger hydrocarbon exports. We expect that the growth will gradually slow down to a medium level of 4 percent.  And this also, of course, is different between countries who have oil and gas and those who are oil importers.  

Inflation, on the other hand, has accelerated in most of the CCA countries, and this is due to some demand pressure and also some important inflation, especially from Russia, in certain countries.  The reform of the electricity tariff also contributed to some of this inflation.  

Countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia have recently enjoyed a relatively high level of growth and performed improvements in building intra-regional cooperation in a certain number of projects, projects including infrastructure.  

And this brings me to your second question on the level of debt.  Several infrastructure projects in rail, as in your country or in electricity, are important for strengthening trade connectivity from East to West, from China to the various trade routes.  And those are important opportunities also to increase connections and connectivity between CCA countries to increase trade and economic integration.  Of course, those public investments will require financing, and a certain number of cases will have an impact on debt.  We encourage countries to be vigilant both in terms of strengthening their economic fundamentals and also make sure that those long-term projects, which will improve their assets, are, on the other hand, well managed in terms of liabilities and increasing liabilities will remain under certain level of debt that is sustainable.  

Of course, this also would require to have a certain number of reforms that will improve economic activity and improve the business environment, which will help a country like Kyrgyzstan that is currently benefiting from all these trades in goods and services to establish itself as a trade and logistics platform.  

MS.  AL SHAMI:  Thank you, Jihad.  And we'll go to two more questions online.  And we don't have much time, so please be free -- be brief.  One question. We can't hear you. So let's take [another question].

QUESTIONER: I'll ask the question in Arabic.  Tunisia was among the negative list that were behind the Article IV consultation, and we've noticed an estrangement between the IMF and Tunisia.  So my question is what has the IMF done for the next review of the Article IV consultation on Tunisia?  And is there any new development to continue the joint cooperation between Tunisia and the IMF?  And more importantly, what is the IMF plan to deal with Tunisia in the future?  Thank you.  

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you.  So, the previous questioner was asking, how does the IMF assess the cooperation with Jordan in light of the rising indebtedness front?  And then we will end, because we are running out of time.  I apologize.

QUESTIONER:    So, I have a question on Morocco.  How is the IMF evaluating the emerging political tensions and their potential impact on the country's economic outlook?  Thank you.  

MS. AL SHAMI: We will end with that.  Jihad, over to you.

AZOUR:  First question, on Tunisia, as you know, the IMF provided significant support for Tunisia in the past few years.  For over a decade, the IMF has provided support for Tunisia to support the economic transformation and stabilize the economy in Tunisia.  In the past, and after reaching an interim agreement on the program, and based on the Tunisian authority's request, at the request of the Tunisian government. This program was not endorsed.  

As for the Article IV consultations, these are consultations with all IMF member states.  It's a commitment on every member state.  In the past three years, Tunisia did not set a timetable for Article IV consultations.  This is something that the Tunisian government should be asked about.  As for the IMF, the IMF continues to stand beside Tunisia and provide support through consultation and technical assistance.  

As for the Moroccan economy, there's no question that the Moroccan economy has managed to raise the growth rates in the past two years, thanks to the improvement in the key sectors such as agriculture, production, and exports.  This contributed to raising the growth rates in Morocco to 4.5 percent in 2025 and reducing the levels of inflation.  This comes after several years when the agriculture sector, because of the drought, was negatively impacted, which had a social impact.  This means there's a need to continue the economic transformation, to create more jobs through different sectors, and strengthen the safety net, through which the inclusiveness could be elevated and more opportunities could be given to the youth, women, and different rural areas.  

This was and remains part of the core of the cooperation with the IMF and Morocco.  In the Annual Meetings in 2023 and thereafter, we had a meeting on these issues in order to enable the abilities of youth and women to perform better and to raise the level of safety net.  This is something that most countries in the region need.  

As for Jordan, Jordan has withstood many shocks in the past few years because of the geopolitical situation, which directly impacted tourism.  In particular, Jordan managed to maintain economic stability.  We've seen a slight improvement in growth rates and continued reforms.  This was a key part of the most recent revision that was conducted successfully in the past few weeks.  

MS. AL SHAMI: That brings us to a close.  If you have any questions that we weren't able to answer, please send them to me or someone from our team.  We will make sure to get back to you as soon as we can.  

As Jihad mentioned, we hope that you will join us in the launch of our Regional Economic Outlook Report in Dubai on October 21 and Almaty on October 30.  

Thank you very much for joining us, and see you next time.  Thank you.