Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornament?

September 1, 2001

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

With the primary objective of conferring credibility on macroeconomic policies, an increasing number of advanced and emerging market economies have adopted various forms of fiscal rules (mainly balanced-budget requirements and debt limits). In contrast to previous fiscal rules, many of which lacked transparency, recently introduced rules have the potential of serving as a useful depoliticized policy framework, and over time, can contribute to stability and growth. To this end, they need to be well designed and supported by an appropriate institutional infrastructure.

Subject: Budget planning and preparation, Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules, Inflation targeting, Monetary policy, Public debt, Public financial management (PFM)

Keywords: arbitration authority, authorities discretion, below-cost pricing, Budget planning and preparation, country, default risk premium, Europe, fiscal policy, Fiscal rules, General government, government, government assets, Inflation targeting, surveillance authority, WP

Pages:
24
Volume:
2001
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451856545.001
Issue:
145
Series:
Working Paper No. 2001/145
Stock No:
WPIEA1452001
ISBN:
9781451856545
ISSN:
1018-5941

IMF’s Work

RESOURCES

TOPICS

Flagship Publications

Other Publications

IMF reports and publications by country

Regional Offices

All News

See Also

For Journalists

Press Center

RESOURCES

FLAGSHIPS

KEY SERIES

IMF NOTES

Loading component...

IMF Working Papers