Inflation Targeting with NAIRU Uncertainty and Endogenous Policy Credibility
IMF Working Papers, January 1, 2001
Source details
- Canonical URL
- Inflation Targeting with NAIRU Uncertainty and Endogenous Policy Credibility
Other formats
Bibliographic details
- Authors: Peter Isard, Douglas Laxton, Ann-Charlotte Eliasson
- Published: January 1, 2001
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451842418.001
Summary
- Stochastic simulations are employed to compare performance of monetary policy rules in linear and nonlinear variants of a small macro model with NAIRU uncertainity under different assumptions about the way inflation expectations are formed.
- Cases in which policy credibility is ignored or treated as exogenous are distinguished from cases in which credibility and inflation expectations respond endogenuously.
- Policy credibility strengthens the case for forward-looking inflation forecast based rules relative to backward-looking Taylor rules.
Methodology and Model Features
- Approach: Stochastic simulations.
- Model: Small macro model with linear and nonlinear variants.
- Key uncertainty: NAIRU uncertainity.
- Expectations frameworks compared:
- Cases with credibility ignored or treated as exogenous.
- Cases with credibility and inflation expectations responding endogenously.
- Policy rules evaluated:
- Forward-looking inflation forecast based (IFB) rules.
- Backward-looking Taylor rules.
Principal Findings
- Endogenous policy credibility affects the relative performance of monetary policy rules.
- Strengthening policy credibility increases the relative attractiveness of forward-looking inflation forecast based rules over backward-looking Taylor rules.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
- Consideration of endogenous credibility is important when assessing monetary policy rules.
- Forward-looking inflation forecast based rules gain support when policy credibility is accounted for endogenously.
Content in this bundle
- Inflation Targeting with NAIRU Uncertainty and Endogenous Policy Credibilty - WP/01/7