International Environmental Taxation in the Absence of Sovereignty
December 1, 1992
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
Traditional public finance theory may be applied to the internalization of international environmental externalities. The policy constraint imposed by the absence of sovereign international government may be partially overcome through international environmental agreements. Instruments such as cost sharing, found in existing agreements, are generally unsophisticated. Two proposals entailing improved instruments are considered: (a) an international carbon tax, and (b) a global commons trust fund financed by earmarked excise taxes or charges. Political realities appear to preclude the early adoption of sophisticated international environmental taxes, but modest improvements in the design and implementation of existing instruments may be feasible.
Subject: Carbon tax, Environment, Environmental taxes, Excises, Extra-budgetary funds, Greenhouse gas emissions, Public financial management (PFM), Taxes
Keywords: access price, administration system, Carbon tax, demand and supply, developing nation, Environmental taxes, excise tax, Excises, Extra-budgetary funds, Global, global warming, Greenhouse gas emissions, home-nation retention, nation B, nations signatory, net benefit, tax academic, tax administration, WP
Pages:
37
Volume:
1992
DOI:
Issue:
104
Series:
Working Paper No. 1992/104
Stock No:
WPIEA1041992
ISBN:
9781451947847
ISSN:
1018-5941






