Rationing Rules and Outcomes: The Experience of Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System
September 1, 2001
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Summary
Since 1990, Singapore has sought to control motor vehicle ownership by means of an auction quota system, whereby prospective vehicle buyers need to obtain a quota license before they can make their purchase. This paper assesses the success of the vehicle quota system in meeting its objectives of stability in motor vehicle growth, flexibility in the motor vehicle mix, and equity among motor vehicle buyers. Two important implementation issues-quota subcategorization and license transferability-are highlighted, and policy lessons are drawn for the design of auction quotas in general.
Subject: Arbitrage, Commodities, Population and demographics, Population growth, Tax incidence, Tax policy, Taxes, Transaction tax
Keywords: Arbitrage, auction quota, auctions, car buyer, category license, license category, license price, licenses, pollution permit, Population growth, price variable, quota growth, quota implementation, quota license, quota premium, Quotas, rate of growth, subcategorization, supply and demand factor, Tax incidence, Transaction tax, transferability, WP
Pages:
30
Volume:
2001
DOI:
Issue:
136
Series:
Working Paper No. 2001/136
Stock No:
WPIEA1362001
ISBN:
9781451855814
ISSN:
1018-5941
