Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability–Exploring the Determinants
June 1, 2008
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
We analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood of establishing adequate governance arrangements are higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank.
Subject: Banking, Financial regulation and supervision, Financial sector, Legal support in revenue administration, Public sector
Keywords: governance arrangement, governance rating, independence rating, monetary policy, WP
Pages:
34
Volume:
2008
DOI:
Issue:
147
Series:
Working Paper No. 2008/147
Stock No:
WPIEA2008147
ISBN:
9781451870053
ISSN:
1018-5941






