Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. Banking System
August 1, 2011
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Summary
Through the profiling of institutional cash pools, this paper explains the rise of the "shadow" banking system from a demand-side perspective. Explaining the rise of shadow banking from this angle paints a very different picture than the supply-side angle that views it as a story of banks' funding preferences and arbitrage. Institutional cash pools prefer to avoid too much unsecured exposure to banks even through insured deposits. Short-term government guaranteed securities are the next best choice, but their supply is insufficient. The shadow banking system arose to fill this vacuum. One way to manage the size of the shadow banking system is by adopting the supply management of Treasury bills as a macroprudential tool.
Subject: Bank deposits, Banking, Commercial banks, Currencies, Financial institutions, Financial services, Government liabilities, Money, Public financial management (PFM), Treasury bills and bonds
Keywords: Bank deposits, cash, cash pool, cash pools' demand, Commercial banks, Currencies, deposit, Global, Government liabilities, institutional cash pools, insurance limit, insured deposit alternative, macroprudential, managed cash pools, money, money market fund, portfolio allocation detail, preferred habitat, reinvestment pool, shadow banking, treasury bill, Treasury bills, Treasury bills and bonds, WP
Pages:
35
Volume:
2011
DOI:
Issue:
190
Series:
Working Paper No. 2011/190
Stock No:
WPIEA2011190
ISBN:
9781462307265
ISSN:
1018-5941
