Optimal Debt Policy Under Asymmetric Risk
August 26, 2016
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Summary
In the paper we show that, most of the time, smooth reduction in the debt ratio is optimal for tax-smoothing purposes when fiscal risks are asymmetric, with large debt-augmenting shocks more likely than commensurate debt reducing shocks. Asymmetric risks are a feature of 200 years of data for the U.S. and the U.K.: rare but recurrent large surges of the debt-to-GDP ratio, followed by very gradual but persistent declines over long periods. More informal evidence from many other countries suggests that asymmetry is a general feature of fiscal shocks. The gradual smooth reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio is not a response to past developments. Instead it is optimal given recurrent fiscal risks and the empirical characteristics of fiscal shocks. The behavior of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the U.K. and the U.S. seems roughly compatible with the prescriptions of the tax-smoothing model.
Subject: Asset and liability management, Debt reduction, Expenditure, Fiscal policy, Fiscal stance, Global financial crisis of 2008-2009, Public debt, Revenue administration
Keywords: debt, debt Policy, debt ratio, debt ratio decline, Debt reduction, debt reduction policy, debt shock, Fiscal Risks, Fiscal Shocks., Fiscal stance, Global, Government Debt, Optimal Debt Policies, policy, public debt debt ratio, ratio, tax ratio, WP
Pages:
21
Volume:
2016
DOI:
Issue:
178
Series:
Working Paper No. 2016/178
Stock No:
WPIEA2016178
ISBN:
9781475529845
ISSN:
1018-5941





