IMF Working Papers

Repo Market Volatility and the U.S. Debt Ceiling

ByMai Dao, Brandon Joel Tan, Jing Zhou

June 27, 2025

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Format: Chicago

Mai Dao, Brandon Joel Tan, and Jing Zhou. "Repo Market Volatility and the U.S. Debt Ceiling", IMF Working Papers 2025, 127 (2025), accessed 12/5/2025, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229015219.001

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Disclaimer: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Summary

Recurring debt ceiling standoffs cause political disruptions and economic costs. We quantify one type of cost which is receiving growing attention: the spillover to short-term funding markets. Using high-frequency aggregate as well as granular money market fund specific data, we find that flows in and out of the Treasury General Account triggered by the debt ceiling mechanism can create large swings in the repo spread and distort the supply of repo funding for the Treasury market. Applying our estimates to the expected debt ceiling lift-off in summer 2025 implies that the repo spread could fluctuate by 20-30 basis points around the lift-off date. A higher level of aggregate bank reserves and overnight reverse repo balance at the Fed can dampen the impact on funding spreads appreciably.

Subject: Asset and liability management, Collateral, Debt limits, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial services, Financial statements, Money markets, Public financial management (PFM), Repo rates

Keywords: Collateral, Debt Ceiling, debt ceiling mechanism, debt ceiling standoff, Debt limits, Financial statements, Global, Money markets, Repo, repo market volatility, Repo rates, Reserves, TGA balance, Treasury General Account