Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism
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Summary:
Vertical tax externalities between levels of government can occur in federal structures, with responses to the tax policies of one level of government affecting the tax base of the other. Such effects mostly arise when federal and state governments co-occupy the same tax base. This paper examines these externalities by considering their implications for a range of issues in fiscal federalism: the relationship between state and federal tax rates, the equilibrium levels of these taxes, the relevance of experience in federal countries for policy design in international settings, intergovernmental grants, and the assignment of tax powers among levels of government.
Series:
Working Paper No. 1997/173
Subject:
Expenditure Fiscal federalism Fiscal policy Rent tax Revenue administration Subnational tax Taxes
Notes:
Also published in Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 3, September 1998.
English
Publication Date:
December 1, 1997
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451977318/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA1731997
Pages:
35
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