THE FLEXIBLE CREDIT LINE (FCL)
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The last update was in April 2025
Learn more about IMF lending, or visit our other lending facilities factsheets:
The last update was in April 2025
The Flexible Credit Line (FCL) is designed to meet the demand for crisis-prevention and crisis-mitigation lending for countries with very strong policy frameworks and track records in economic performance.
Purpose |
Provide financial support to countries with very strong economic fundamentals and sustained policy track records to help them meet actual or potential balance of payments needs and boost market confidence during a period of heightened risks. |
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Eligibility |
Very strong economic fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks. |
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A sustained track record of implementing very strong policies and continued commitment to maintain such policies in the future. |
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In addition to a very positive assessment of the country’s policies in the most recent Article IV consultations, the following criteria are used to assess a country’s qualification:
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Strong performance against all the relevant criteria above would not be necessary to secure qualification. However, significant shortcomings on one or more of these criteria —unless there are compensating factors, including corrective policy measures underway— would generally signal that the member is not among the very strong performers for whom the FCL is intended. |
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The above criteria are the same as for the Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL). |
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Conditionality |
Ex-ante conditionality in the form of qualification criteria. No ex-post (“program”) conditionality, given the strength of the policy frameworks, as attested by FCL qualification. See more on conditionality. |
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Review
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Under a two-year arrangement, an IMF Executive Board review of the member’s policies needs to be completed within 12 months of approval of the arrangement so the country can retain access to IMF resources in the second year. The review assesses the country’s continued adherence to the qualification criteria. |
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Terms |
Duration |
Renewable credit line, initially for one or two years. |
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Repayment |
Over a 3¼ to 5-year period |
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| Interest rate and fees |
The lending rate comprises:
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Resources are subject to a commitment fee levied at the beginning of each 12 month period on amounts that could be drawn in the period (15 basis points for committed amounts up to 200 percent of quota, 30 basis points on committed amounts above 200 percent and up to 600 percent of quota and 60 basis points on amounts exceeding 600 percent of quota). Fees are refunded pro rata if amounts are drawn during the course of the relevant period. If a country borrows the entire amount, the fee is fully refunded. However, no refund is made when countries do not draw. |
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A service charge of 50 basis points is applied on each amount drawn. |
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| Access |
Entire amount of access available upon approval and remains available throughout the arrangement period, subject to the completion of the mid-term review for two-year arrangements. Exit strategy from the FCL to be articulated for FCLs with access above 200 percent of quota. |
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No access cap. Need for resources is assessed on a case-by-case basis depending on the member's actual or potential balance of payments need. Concurrent use with SLL (which share the same qualification criteria) is possible if justified by the nature and magnitude of external risks and potential balance of payments needs. |
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