Controlling Fiscal Corruption

Author/Editor:

Sheetal K. Chand ; Karl Ove Moene

Publication Date:

August 1, 1997

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper examines the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. First, a case study of a successful attack on corruption is presented that shows the importance of attending to the conditions of service of fiscal officers. Second, a model is developed drawing on the conclusions of the case study that shows their consistency with optimization behavior. It confirms that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a virtuous circle.

Series:

Working Paper No. 97/100

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

August 1, 1997

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451852363/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA1001997

Price:

$15.00 (Academic Rate:$15.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

17

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