Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?
June 1, 1997
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Summary
This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.
Subject: Civil service, Corruption, Crime, Income, Labor, National accounts, Public sector wages, Wages
Keywords: Africa, black market, capitulation wage, civil servant, Civil service, civil service wage, Corruption, Income, manufacturing wage, market clearing wage, pay reform, private sector, private sector wage, Public sector wages, relative wage, wage data, wage hypothesis, wage policy, wage variable, wage-corruption hypothesis, Wages, wg relative, WP
Pages:
56
Volume:
1997
DOI:
Issue:
073
Series:
Working Paper No. 1997/073
Stock No:
WPIEA0731997
ISBN:
9781451849424
ISSN:
1018-5941
