Fiscal Rules and the Budget Process
June 1, 1996
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
This paper examines the rationale for the imposition of fiscal rules as a way to reduce budgetary imbalances. It presents theoretical arguments for the existence of a “fiscal deficit bias” and the empirical evidence on the economic, political and institutional factors leading to this bias. In the context of these findings, it discusses the potential role of legal constraints on the level of key fiscal variables, and of reforms in budgetary procedures in enhancing fiscal discipline. It also evaluates proposals for budgetary reform in Italy.
Subject: Budget planning and preparation, Expenditure, Fiscal policy, Government debt management, Public debt, Public financial management (PFM)
Keywords: Budget planning and preparation, budget proposal, finance minister, Government debt management, government fiscal policy decision, government policy formation, government resignation, government stage, government vis-à-vis parliament, WP
Pages:
39
Volume:
1996
DOI:
Issue:
060
Series:
Working Paper No. 1996/060
Stock No:
WPIEA0601996
ISBN:
9781451848007
ISSN:
1018-5941





