Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
IMF Working Papers, December 1, 2001
Source details
- Canonical URL
- Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
Other formats
Bibliographic details
- Authors: Reza Baqir
- Published: December 1, 2001
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451874709.001
Overview and research question
- Author: Reza Baqir
- Publication date: December 1, 2001
- Series: Working Paper No. 2001/208
- Issue: 208
- Volume: 2001
- Pages: 30
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451874709.001
- Stock No: WPIEA2082001
- ISBN: 9781451874709
- ISSN: 1018-5941
- Core question: What determines budgetary institutions—specifically, the executive veto—and how does legislature size influence whether executives are empowered with veto authority?
Theoretical framework
- Central prediction: Jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives.
- Mechanism: Larger numbers of electoral districts increase the set of political actors sharing fiscal resources, creating incentives to centralize veto authority in the executive to manage common-pool spending.
Empirical approach
- Data scope: Cross-section of local governments in the United States.
- Identification strategy: An econometric framework is used to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts.
- Model types mentioned: Probit models (listed among subjects/keywords).
Key findings
- Jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.
- The empirical evidence presented supports the theoretical prediction linking legislature size to the adoption of executive veto authority.
Subjects and keywords (as listed)
- Subjects: Budget planning and preparation, Econometric analysis, Expenditure, National accounts, Personal income, Population and demographics, Probit models, Public financial management (PFM)
- Keywords: Budget planning and preparation, city government, city manager, council size, executive veto, government spending, mayor-council city, Personal income, political institutions, Probit models, state indicator, veto authority, WP
Publication note
- Disclaimer provided in the paper: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
Source: IMF Working Paper — "Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto" by Reza Baqir, Working Paper No. 2001/208 (December 1, 2001).
Content in this bundle
- Goverment Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto - WP/01/208