Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto

Author/Editor:

Reza Baqir

Publication Date:

December 1, 2001

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.

Series:

Working Paper No. 01/208

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

December 1, 2001

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451874709/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2082001

Format:

Paper

Pages:

30

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