Intellectual Property Rights and International R&D Competition

Author/Editor:

Stefania Scandizzo

Publication Date:

June 1, 2001

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper examines a country's incentives for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in a global trading environment. There is a time inconsistency problem intrinsic to IPR protection: ex ante strong protection is warranted to promote innovation, but once discovery takes place there is an incentive to lower protection. The sub optimal but time consistent policy involves an insufficient level of protection and, therefore, of innovation. In more technologically advanced economies reputational considerations may be sufficient to maintain strong protection. Otherwise a commitment mechanism, such as participation in the World Trade Organization, or, more controversially, some form of bilateral punishment, may be used.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2001/081

Subject:

Competition Consumption Economic sectors Financial markets Foreign corporations Income National accounts Personal income Tax incentives Technology

English

Publication Date:

June 1, 2001

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451850369/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0812001

Pages:

24

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