IMF Working Papers

Intrahousehold Allocation of Resources: The Bolivian Family

By Gabriela Inchauste

May 1, 2001

Download PDF

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Gabriela Inchauste. Intrahousehold Allocation of Resources: The Bolivian Family, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2001) accessed November 14, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

Recognizing that intrahousehold inequalities exist, this study focuses on the distribution of resources toward children across household types. A bargaining framework is used to test whether it matters who has control over resources. Results show that control over resources matters, as well as the characteristics of family members. The policy implication is that the education of mothers is important to improve child welfare, over and above the benefits of cash transfer schemes. Parental education campaigns should accompany child welfare programs, particularly among indigenous families. Children fare better when mothers are educated, both parents are present, and there are fewer children.

Subject: Education, Expenditure, Household consumption, Labor, National accounts, Personal income

Keywords: Bargaining model, Bolivia, Child welfare, Clothing expenditure, Durable goods, Expenditure system, Household bargaining, Household consumption, Household income, Log likelihood ratio test, Null hypothesis, Personal income, Resource allocation, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    26

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2001/057

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA0572001

  • ISBN:

    9781451847772

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941