Unemployment Benefits Versus Conditional Negative Income Taxes
July 1, 1995
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Summary
The paper analyzes the wage-employment effects of replacing unemployment benefits by negative income taxes. It first surveys the major equity and efficiency effects of unemployment benefits versus negative income taxes, and summarizes the salient features of many European unemployment benefit systems in this light. Second, it presents a simple theoretical model that focuses on the relative wage-employment effects of unemployment benefits versus negative income taxes. Finally, it provides some empirical groundwork for assessing this relative effect
Subject: Employment, Expenditure, Income tax systems, Labor, Personal income tax, Taxes, Unemployment, Unemployment benefits
Keywords: Employment, Europe, government budget constraint, Income tax systems, negative income tax scheme, negative income tax system, Personal income tax, systems operative, Unemployment, unemployment benefit system, Unemployment benefits, unemployment insurance, Western Europe, WP
Pages:
22
Volume:
1995
DOI:
Issue:
065
Series:
Working Paper No. 1995/065
Stock No:
WPIEA0651995
ISBN:
9781451848649
ISSN:
1018-5941
