Financial Frictions, Investment, and Institutions
IMF Working Papers, October 1, 2010
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- Financial Frictions, Investment, and Institutions
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Yishay Yafeh, Kenichi Ueda, Stijn Claessens
- Published: October 1, 2010
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781455209316.001
Overview
- Research question: Can institutional reforms reduce financial frictions?
- Conceptual framework: Canonical investment model analyzing two channels:
- (i) financial transaction costs at the firm level;
- (ii) required return at the country level.
- Empirical scope: Panel of 75,000 firm-years across 48 countries for the period 1990 - 2007.
Methodology
- Model: Canonical investment model linking financial frictions to investment decisions via transaction costs and required returns.
- Empirical approach: Panel analysis using firm-level data covering 75,000 firm-years in 48 countries over 1990 - 2007.
- Institutional variables examined include measures of corporate governance, contractual enforcement, and creditor rights.
Key Findings
- Improved corporate governance reduces financial frictions (example channel: less informational problems).
- Enhanced contractual enforcement reduces financial frictions.
- Stronger creditor rights (example channel: lower collateral constraints) are less important in reducing financial frictions.
Policy Implications and Interpretation
- Institutional reforms that improve corporate governance can be effective in lowering firm-level financial transaction costs and easing investment frictions.
- Strengthening contractual enforcement can lower country-level required returns and reduce financial frictions.
- Policies focused solely on strengthening creditor rights (to lower collateral constraints) may have limited impact on financial frictions relative to governance and enforcement reforms.
Content in this bundle
- Microsoft Word - Financial Frictions Investment and Institutions WP docx 2 2.docx