Limiting Taxpayer "Puts" - An Example from Central Counterparties

Author/Editor:

Manmohan Singh

Publication Date:

November 12, 2014

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

Nonbanks such as central counterparties (CCPs) are a useful lens to see how regulators view the role of the lender-of-last-resort (LOLR). This paper explores the avenues available when a nonbank failure is likely, specifically by considering the options of keeping CCPs afloat. It is argued that CCPs have, by regulatory fiat, become “too important to fail,” and thus the imperative should be greater loss-sharing by all participants that better align the distribution of risks and rewards of CCPs, the clearing members and derivative end-users. In the context of LOLR, the proposed variation margin gains haircut (VMGH) is discussed as a way of limiting the taxpayer put.

Series:

Working Paper No. 14/203

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

November 12, 2014

ISBN/ISSN:

9781498322423/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2014203

Price:

$18.00 (Academic Rate:$18.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

16

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