Optimal Tax Administration

Author/Editor:

Michael Keen ; Joel Slemrod

Publication Date:

January 20, 2017

Electronic Access:

Free Full Text. Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file

Disclaimer: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Summary:

This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.

Series:

Working Paper No. 17/8

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

January 20, 2017

ISBN/ISSN:

9781475570267/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2017008

Price:

$18.00 (Academic Rate:$18.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

27

Please address any questions about this title to publications@imf.org