Do Old Habits Die Hard? Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle
IMF Working Papers, July 24, 2019
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Eric Monnet, Damien Puy
- Published: July 24, 2019
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498326773.001
Summary
- Research question: Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944–1971) when only the US had to?
- Core argument: Gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers who continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard.
- Key mechanism: The longer an institution spent in the gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency.
- Main implication: Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never worked as expected; even after radical institutional change, history continued to shape policymakers’ decisions.
Findings and analysis
- Historical persistence: Central banks’ behavior under Bretton Woods reflected continued adherence to pre-WWII gold standard practice.
- Cross-country heterogeneity: Countries with longer exposure to the gold standard exhibited a stronger relationship between gold reserves and currency in circulation.
- Role of policymakers’ age: Older policymakers were associated with stronger correlations between gold reserves and currency, indicating personal institutional memory effects.
- Systemic consequence: The imperfect substitutability between dollars and gold undermined the intended functioning of the Bretton Woods system.
Policy-relevant conclusions
- Institutional memory matters: Policy reforms that aim to change central bank reserve behavior should account for deeply ingrained institutional practices and the demographic composition of policymakers.
- Transition risks: Radical institutional changes do not automatically eliminate legacy behaviors; transition policies should explicitly address persistent habits rooted in historical regimes.
Publication and metadata
- Authors: Eric Monnet, Damien Puy
- Publication date: July 24, 2019
- Series: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 2019/161
- Pages: 32
- Volume: 2019
- Issue: 161
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498326773.001
- Stock No: WPIEA2019161
- ISBN: 9781498326773
- ISSN: 1018-5941
IMF Working Paper — "Do Old Habits Die Hard? Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle" (Eric Monnet and Damien Puy), July 24, 2019.
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