Designing Central Bank Digital Currencies

Author/Editor:

Itai Agur ; Anil Ari ; Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publication Date:

November 18, 2019

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Summary:

We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of payment instruments dependent on the number of their users. CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest-bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.

Series:

Working Paper No. 19/252

English

Publication Date:

November 18, 2019

ISBN/ISSN:

9781513519883/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2019252

Price:

$18.00 (Academic Rate:$18.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

38

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