The Role of Board Oversight in Central Bank Governance: Key Legal Design Issues
IMF Working Papers, December 27, 2019
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Wouter Bossu, Arthur D. P. Rossi
- Published: December 27, 2019
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513524054.001
Overview and Scope
- Authors: Wouter Bossu, Arthur D. P. Rossi
- Date: December 27, 2019
- Series: Working Paper No. 2019/293
- Issue: 293
- Volume: 2019
- Pages: 71
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513524054.001
- ISBN: 9781513524054
- ISSN: 1018-5941
Purpose and Focus
- Examines key legal issues in the design of Board Oversight in central banks.
- Focuses on the Oversight Board as an internal decision-making body that ensures the central bank is well-managed.
- Contrasts current practices across IMF membership with staff’s advisory practice.
Contextualization within Central Bank Governance
- Positions Board oversight as one of the core decision-making responsibilities of central banks.
- Notes that most economic literature focuses on monetary policy formulation; this paper redirects attention to governance through Board oversight.
Comparative Coverage and Evidence Base
- Contrasts practices of the IMF membership’s 174 central banks with staff’s advisory practice developed over the past 50 years.
- Uses the comparative exercise to identify legal design issues relevant to Board Oversight.
Major Themes and Legal Design Issues (as emphasized in the paper)
- Definition and scope of the Oversight Board’s decision-making responsibility within central bank legal frameworks.
- Interaction between Board oversight and executive management or other central bank decision-making structures.
- Legal design implications for central bank organization, mandate, and legislation.
- Relevance for transparency, accountability, and sound governance in central banks.
Subject Areas and Keywords
- Subject tags: Bank supervision; Banking; Central bank governance; Central bank legislation; Central bank mandate; Central bank organization; Central banks; Legal support in revenue administration; Revenue administration
- Keywords include: Africa; Board oversight; boards of directors; central bank Decision-making; central bank Decision-Making responsibility; central bank decision-making structures; central bank governance; Central bank governance; central bank law; central bank law provision; Central bank legislation; Central bank mandate; central bank official; Central bank organization; decision-making responsibility; executive management; Global; Legal support in revenue administration; Oversight responsibility; public policy; WP
Findings and Implications (summarized)
- Board oversight is a central feature of sound central bank governance and is distinct from monetary policy decision-making.
- Legal design choices for Oversight Boards have material implications for how central banks are managed and held accountable.
- A comparative review of 174 central banks and 50 years of IMF advisory practice provides the empirical and advisory basis for identifying legal design trade-offs.
Usage Notes
- This paper is part of IMF Working Papers, which describe research in progress and are published to elicit comments and encourage debate.
- Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
Source: The Role of Board Oversight in Central Bank Governance: Key Legal Design Issues, Wouter Bossu and Arthur D. P. Rossi, IMF Working Papers 2019/293 (December 27, 2019).
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- Working Paper