Reducing Risk While Sharing It: A Fiscal Recipe for The EU at the Time of COVID-19
IMF Working Papers, September 4, 2020
Source details
- Canonical URL
- Reducing Risk While Sharing It: A Fiscal Recipe for The EU at the Time of COVID-19
Other formats
Bibliographic details
- Authors: Nicoletta Batini, Francesco Lamperti, Andrea Roventini
- Published: September 4, 2020
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513551920.001
Summary
- Authors: Nicoletta Batini, Francesco Lamperti, Andrea Roventini
- Date: September 4, 2020
- Core problem: COVID-19 lockdowns require large fiscal responses across European countries, but countries differ in economic conditions and fiscal space.
- Approach: Builds on the model by Berger et al. (2019) to compare gains from alternative mechanisms of EU fiscal integration in the presence of moral hazard.
Main findings
- Any EU response strategy to the COVID-19 crisis that excludes mutual financial support to member countries lacks credibility.
- Some form of fiscal risk sharing is better than none, especially when sovereign default risk for some EU member countries is increasing.
- Risk sharing creates moral hazard; this moral hazard can be hedged by introducing fiscal delegation to Brussels.
- The optimal level of fiscal delegation depends on delegation costs:
- When delegation costs are low, risk sharing and delegation are substitutes: optimal policy is high delegation and low risk sharing.
- When delegation costs are high, centralization and risk sharing are complements: both high delegation and high risk sharing are needed.
- Proposed EU arrangements in response to the COVID-19 shock appear to combine fiscal risk sharing and delegation via fiscal spending conditionality, reflecting these insights.
Policy implications and recommendations
- Implement some form of mutual financial support across EU member countries to ensure credibility of the EU response.
- Combine fiscal risk sharing with mechanisms to mitigate moral hazard—specifically, design delegation of fiscal authority to Brussels with appropriate conditionality.
- Calibrate the degree of delegation according to the costs of delegation:
- If delegation costs are low, prioritize delegation over extensive risk sharing.
- If delegation costs are high, implement both stronger centralization and more extensive risk sharing.
Content in this bundle
- Working Paper