The IMF-World Bank Concordat (SM/89/54, Rev. 1)
March 31, 1989
To: Members of the Executive Board
From: The Acting Secretary
Subject: Bank-Fund Collaboration in Assisting Member Countries
The President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund have reached agreement on the attached text. This document, jointly prepared by the managements of the Bank and the Fund, reviews the current status of cooperation between the Fund and the Bank and provides for the administrative and procedural steps that are necessary to secure a constructive and stronger collaboration between them.
The purposes and mandates of the Bank and the Fund are defined in their Articles of Agreement, as interpreted by their respective Boards. Operating within the framework of the Articles, the managements of both institutions believe that it is of the utmost importance to ensure the closest possible collaboration and working relations between the two institutions in order to serve member governments with maximum effectiveness in meeting their development needs and in providing support for macroeconomic and structural change.
The guidelines contained in the attached document are intended to achieve this objective and should help avoid administrative friction and facilitate orderly resolution of differences of views. Both of us recognize that the advice, suggestions and support of each institution for the other are essential if they are to discharge their responsibilities effectively and promptly. Smooth and effective working relations between the two institutions have assumed special importance in view of the contribution that both of them are expected to make to policy formulation and sustained economic growth in their member countries.
The staff will be instructed to implement the guidelines embodied in this document in a spirit of close collaboration. This matter will be brought to the agenda for discussion on a date to be announced.
Attachment
Memorandum to the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund and the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank March 30, 1989
FROM: The Managing Director The President
SUBJECT: Bank-Fund Collaboration in Assisting Member Countries
1. Guidelines for collaboration between our two institutions have been in place since 1966. They have been reviewed and strengthened on a number of occasions since then. We, and our colleagues in the management of both institutions, have recently reviewed the experience with collaboration under existing policy and practices.
2. The problems faced by our member countries are severe. They are struggling to restore stability, to adjust their economies to a more rapidly changing and less benign international environment, and to restore growth, while they continue to grapple with their massive debt overhangs and limited availability of both concessional funds and commercial capital. The majority of the members of our two organizations face serious problems. Many of them face the urgent need for change in policies, institutions, and the incentive framework. All are entitled, in our view, to the best advice our highly competent staffs can provide—each by drawing on their specialized technical expertise and experience. It is our responsibility, and that of our Boards, to ensure that the procedures in place make possible, to the fullest extent practicable, comprehensive analyses by our staffs, early exchange of views on differences, and a system to refer remaining differences to the appropriate level of management for resolution. Proposals to improve our capacity to achieve these objectives are set forth in this paper.
3. The existing guidelines lay down principles which remain sound and provide a firm basis on which to build. They provide the Bank with “. . . primary responsibility for the composition and appropriateness of development programs and project evaluation, including development priorities.” The Fund is assigned “. . . primary responsibility for exchange rates and restrictive systems, for adjustment of temporary balance of payments disequilibria, and for evaluating and assisting members to work out stabilization programs as a sound basis for economic advance.” The guidelines further provide that “in between these two clear-cut areas of responsibility . . . there is a broad range of matters which are of interest to both institutions. This range includes such matters as the structure and functioning of financial institutions, the adequacy of money and capital markets, the actual and potential capacity of the member to generate domestic savings, the financial implications of economic development programs, both for the internal financial position of the country and for its external situation, foreign debt problems, and so on.”
4. The same guidelines also stipulate that “[on those matters in the area of primary responsibility of the Bank], the Fund, and particularly the field missions of the Fund, should inform themselves of the established views and position of the Bank and adopt those views as a working basis for their own work. This does not preclude discussions between the Bank and the Fund as to those matters, but it does mean that the Fund (and Fund missions) will not engage in a critical review of those matters with member countries unless it is done with the prior consent of the Bank.” Corresponding provisions were made for the Bank and Bank missions.
5. While we reaffirm the principles of these guidelines, the overlap of activities of the two institutions has grown rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s as the Bank and the Fund have attempted to respond to the massive financing and adjustment requirements of members in a more difficult economic environment. In recognition of the longer-term and supply-oriented nature of the adjustment process, the Fund increased its consideration of structural issues in stand-by arrangements; extended the repayment period of extended arrangements to 10 years; and introduced the concessional and relatively long-term Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). In response to the serious balance of payments problems affecting many developing countries stemming from the sharp deterioration of the terms of trade and from the weakness in domestic policies and institutions, the Bank introduced Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) in 1980 that provided financing in support of policies to promote structural, economy-wide changes and, subsequently, Sector Adjustment Loans (SECALs), which focused on structural changes in specific sectors.
6. There is continuous and successful cooperation between the Bank and the Fund. Close contacts between the two staffs contribute to a better understanding of economic problems and policy options, and normally lead to improved and consistent policy advice; better coordination of the amounts, forms, and timing of financial assistance; and a greater effectiveness in mobilizing additional financial support.
7. Yet, given the complexity of the problems faced by our members and the perspectives of the two institutions, it is not unusual that differences of view may sometimes arise. In a few cases, some significant differences about country priorities and policy have emerged. In some cases, they have spilled into discussions by the staff with country authorities. Differences of view have concerned a number of areas, including exchange rate, the level of external assistance sufficient to provide reasonable prospects for sustained and successful adjustment efforts and resumption of growth, the speed of adjustment, and the need to maintain adequate levels of public sector development expenditures. At other times, differences of view between the staffs of the two institutions have centered on the trade-off between efficiency gains from certain structural measures to be accrued over time and balance of payments and budgetary impacts.
8. With the growing contiguity of the activities of the Bank and the Fund, we believe it is essential to strengthen collaboration, to ensure that conflicts of views are resolved at an early stage, do not surface in contacts with country authorities, and do not result in differing policy advice to member countries.
9. The Fund has among its purposes the promotion of economic conditions conducive to growth, price stability, and balance of payments sustainability and is required to exercise surveillance on a continual basis over the performance of its members as defined by Article IV. The Fund is empowered to provide temporary balance of payments financing to members to enable them to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity. Thus, the Fund has focused on the aggregate aspects of macroeconomic policies and their related instruments—including public sector spending and revenues, aggregate wage and price policies, money and credit, interest rates and the exchange rate. The Fund has to discharge responsibilities with respect to surveillance, exchange rate matters, balance of payments, growth-oriented stabilization policies and their related instruments. These are the areas in which the Fund has a mandate, primary responsibility, and a record of expertise and experience.
10. The Bank has the objective of promoting economic growth and conditions conducive to efficient resource allocation, which it pursues through investment lending, sectoral and structural adjustment loans. Thus, the Bank has focused on development strategies; sector and project investments; structural adjustment programs; policies which deal with the efficient allocation of resources in both public and private sectors: priorities in government expenditures; reforms of administrative systems, production, trade and financial sectors; the restructuring of state enterprises and sector policies. Moreover, as a market-based institution, the Bank also concerns itself with issues relating to the creditworthiness of its members. In these areas, except for the aggregate aspects of the economic policies mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Bank has a mandate, primary responsibility, and a record of expertise and experience.
11. While it is important to strengthen the framework for collaboration and to reduce the risk of conflict and duplication, both the Bank and the Fund must be allowed to explore their legitimate concerns with regard to macroeconomic and structural issues and to take them into account in their policy advice and lending operations. The 1966 guidelines stipulate that views on matters clearly within the area of “primary responsibility” of one or the other of the two institutions “should be expressed to members only by or with the consent of that institution.” This provision remains appropriate. The procedures for enhanced collaboration spelled out below are designed to assure resolution of issues. It is, of course, equally important that borrowing countries be aware of the responsibility of the institution for policy advice in the areas of its primary responsibility.
12. The objective of the enhanced collaboration procedures is to avoid differing policy advice, but this does not mean that one institution should not engage in analyses in the areas of primary responsibilities of the other institution. On the contrary, the institutions and borrowing members normally stand to benefit from analyses from different perspectives, and thorough discussions between the two staffs are encouraged. In the event differences of view persist at the staff level even after a thorough common examination of them, and should the differences not be resolved by the management, the institution which does not have the primary responsibility would, except in exceptional circumstances, yield to the judgment of the other institution. In those cases, which are expected to be extremely rare, the managements will wish to consult their respective Executive Boards before proceeding. Also, in the interest of efficiency of staff resource use, each institution should rely as much as possible on analyses and monitoring of the other institution in the areas of primary responsibilities of the latter, while safeguarding the independence of institutional decisions.
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