Auction Quotas with a Foreign Duopoly
March 1, 2000
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Summary
This paper uses a partial equilibrium framework to compare the welfare consequences of different methods of quota administration relative to free trade under imperfect competition. It shows that a country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by setting a quota at the free trade quantity and giving a fraction of the quota licenses to the duopolists while auctioning off the rest.
Subject: Asset prices, Import licensing, Imports, International trade, Prices, Trade barriers, Trade liberalization
Keywords: Asset prices, Auction quota, Australia and New Zealand, duopoly, Europe, free trade, Import licensing, importing country, Imports, license price, quota level, quota license, response function, Trade liberalization, WP
Pages:
21
Volume:
2000
DOI:
Issue:
065
Series:
Working Paper No. 2000/065
Stock No:
WPIEA0652000
ISBN:
9781451848670
ISSN:
1018-5941
