Sanctions and Civil Conflict
May 1, 2001
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Summary
Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance. The likelihood of success rises as this income increases.
Subject: Consumption, Defense spending, Expenditure, Labor, National accounts, Personal income, Wages
Keywords: Africa, apartheid government, Castro regime, challenger group, challenger's victory, Conflict, Consumption, defeat income, Defense spending, Personal income, Sanctions, Surrender, victory income, WP
Pages:
37
Volume:
2001
DOI:
Issue:
066
Series:
Working Paper No. 2001/066
Stock No:
WPIEA0662001
ISBN:
9781451848793
ISSN:
1018-5941
