Political Economy of Multi-Level Tax Assignments in Latin American Countries: Earmarked Revenue Versus Tax Autonomy
March 1, 2008
Download PDF
More Formats on IMF eLibrary
Order a Print CopyDisclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective.
Subject: Personal income tax, Property tax, Revenue administration, Subnational tax, Value-added tax
Keywords: federal government, personal income, reform agenda, tax administration, tax reform, VAT-type tax, WP
Pages:
27
Volume:
2008
DOI:
Issue:
071
Series:
Working Paper No. 2008/071
Stock No:
WPIEA2008071
ISBN:
9781451869330
ISSN:
1018-5941
