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Address by Michel Camdessus
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
at the Europe-Latin America Convention
Bordeaux, France, October 20, 1997
Latin America has long been characterized as a region of enormous economic promise thanks to
its abundant natural resources, substantial industrial base, and potentially vast internal market.
But in decades past, these complimentary words were often just the preamble to a long lament
about poor management and lost opportunities. Latin America has changed a great deal since
those days. From my vantage point at the IMF, I can say that Latin America is now a region on
the move, a region that is at last beginning to fulfill its vast economic potential, a region that is
consequently full of new promise and possibilities. In my remarks to you this morning, I would
like to sketch out how I see the situation evolving in that vast continent and discuss the
challenges it faces in this new era of globalization.
* * * * *
Old Battles
Each time I travel to Latin America—and during more than ten years at the IMF, I have
made countless trips there—I am amazed by how much attitudes and policies have changed
and economic performance has improved. A decade ago, few countries, with the notable
exception of Chile and Bolivia, had adopted a comprehensive approach to economic reform.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, there had been sporadic attempts to achieve macroeconomic
recovery, but the underlying structural causes of high inflation, weak balance of payments, and
anemic growth had been left largely unaddressed. To be sure, there were a growing number of
policymakers who recognized the need to take a more comprehensive approach. But it took time
to develop the consensus to do so. In the meantime, bitter doctrinal battles were waged over such
issues as the need for fiscal and monetary discipline, the appropriate roles of the state and the
private sector, the merits of economic liberalization, and the virtues of deregulation.
Today, these old battles are by and large a distant memory. Since the late 1980s, most
countries in the region have drawn the lessons of past policy experiments and their disappointing
and sometimes catastrophic economic and social consequences. Thus, they have found
cooperative solutions to their debt problems and turned to other objectives: achieving
macroeconomic stability, making their economies more modern and efficient by promoting
domestic competition, trade liberalization, privatization, and foreign investment, and decisively
integrating themselves into the global economy.
The results of this policy shift have been remarkable. Average growth in Latin America and
the Caribbean rose from less than 1 ½ percent in 1988-89 to 5 percent in 1994, the highest
rate since 1980. And although the economies of the region were not immune to the
"Tequila effect" associated with the Mexican crisis, growth is now once again close
to 5 percent for the region as a whole. Meanwhile, average inflation in the region has fallen from
a breathtaking 1,100 percent in 1989 to an expected 13 percent at the end of this year—on
average still too high, but a major improvement. Private capital inflows have increased from
close to zero in 1989 to over US$70 billion last year—3.5 percent of the region’s
GDP—and the gross international reserves of the region as a whole have increased fivefold
over the same period. In short, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are generally
performing better than at any time in the past twenty years. Against this general background,
there have been some outstanding achievements in the last few years. Mexico’s rapid
recovery from the 1994-95 crisis, Argentina’s success with its currency board
arrangement, and Brazil’s accomplishments under the Real Plan come immediately to
mind. And, of course, in many ways, Chile continues to show the way for the continent.
New challenges
But enough praise. If I were to give a full account of Latin America’s success story,
we would be here long into the night. So let me turn instead to where I see the challenges for the
region. In my view, there are two sets of issues that need to be tackled head on.
The first concerns public frustration over widespread poverty, income inequality, and the
generally slow pace of social progress. Despite the recovery in recent years, inequality remains
pronounced, and it is estimated that more than one third of all households, or more than 200
million people, continue to live in poverty. Of course, there are some exceptions—poverty
is less prevalent in the countries of the southern cone, and Chile is making a measurable dent in
poverty levels. But the overall picture of growth and social progress in Latin America over the
last 30 years is clearly less than satisfactory.
The second challenge has to do with the need to equip these economies to maintain their
access to the international capital market and weather changing conditions in global markets. The
recent crisis in Thailand and its contagion to other southeast Asian economies show once again
how quickly market sentiment can shift and how costly a loss of market confidence can be. Latin
America has not been affected by these developments, nor would the policies now in place
suggest that such developments would be replicated in the region. Still, the experience in
southeast Asia is a call to vigilance for every country that taps, or hopes to tap, the international
capital market.
At first glance, these two challenges may seem worlds apart—as distant from one
another as the villages of the altiplano or the favelas of Rio de Janeiro are from the office towers
in Buenos Aires or Sao Paulo. But on closer inspection, these issues are more closely related than
first meets the eye.
High but sustainable growth is a precondition for achieving a decisive and lasting
improvement in economic opportunities and social conditions in Latin America. And the
availability of private foreign capital can help increase investment, create new jobs, and thereby
accelerate economic growth and social progress. But sustained growth and capital inflows require
sound macroeconomic policies and continuing decisive structural reforms to improve the
investment climate and allow markets to work better—all of which may be called into
question unless the fruits of economic success are more equitably shared. Moreover, when
market confidence is lost, it is the poor and the disadvantaged who suffer most from the ensuing
economic disruption. I would also add that low levels of education and health associated with the
rise in poverty dampen productivity and growth and discourage investment. For all of these
reasons, the challenges of combating poverty and income inequality and of maintaining market
confidence are linked.
What then should countries do to meet these two challenges? The only feasible policy
course—and, indeed, the approach being taken in the programs supported by the IMF, the
World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank—is, first, to continue with the
stabilization policies and reforms that have contributed most to the improved investment climate
and stronger growth of the 1990s; and second, to decide what to do to ensure that the benefits of
this stronger growth are more widely and equitably shared. This latter set of reforms is what has
been referred to as the "second generation" of reform. As you will see, many of the
reforms that would be most effective in making economic opportunities more widely available
throughout that continent, and thus in overcoming the problems of poverty and income
inequality, are also the reforms that will also make these economies more competitive, more
resilient, more attractive to foreign capital, and better able to cope with global market forces. Let
me elaborate.
The second generation of reform
The crux of the "second generation" of reform has to do with completing the
transformation of the role of the State. During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Latin America
made considerable progress on what might be termed "first generation" reforms that
reduced the public sector’s role in productive activities that could be better performed by
the private sector and gave market forces the necessary leading role in allocating domestic
resources. Now, to complete this reform process, countries need to move from "less
State" to "better State." Herein lie the tasks for the second generation of
reform: developing efficient, accountable government institutions that will guarantee the rule of
law and support private sector initiative and activity; and providing the infrastructure and public
services that the State is best placed to provide.
Of course, one cannot draw a sharp distinction between these two generations of reform.
Many countries have already begun to take measures associated with the second generation of
reform, even though the reform programs associated with the first generation have yet to be fully
completed. But I see at least four tasks that must be on the agenda for the second generation of
reform in Latin America.
The first task is to enforce the rule of law and uphold the
professionalism and independence of the judicial system—ensuring that there is prompt and
equal justice for all, and giving confidence to all members of society that contracts will be
enforced, rights will be protected, and property will be secure. Supporting measures are needed to
increase the capacity of the court system, increase the professionalism of the police, and improve
civil administration. For the economy to function smoothly, for the government and its reform
program to retain credibility and support, the system must give confidence that justice will be
done.
The second task is to work energetically toward establishing simpler, more
transparent regulatory systems that are equitably enforced—systems that ensure equal access
to markets and thus promote equality of economic opportunity; systems that encourage
competition, eliminate unnecessary business costs and, thus, promote efficiency and growth.
One crucial aspect of the regulatory environment concerns the effectiveness of prudential
regulation and supervision in the banking sector. Certainly, Latin American governments are well
aware of the importance of this issue, but developments in Thailand and Indonesia, where
growing doubts about the soundness of the banking system contributed to the loss of market
confidence, have refocussed attention on this issue. In this regard, even countries well advanced
in the bank restructuring process would have much to gain from increasing the transparency of
the financial sector. In particular, a more timely, comprehensive, and accurate flow of
information aboutfinancial sector operations would help improve the sector’s internal
management, permit more effective supervision, and allow markets to make more informed
judgments about underlying conditions, all of which would enhance the soundness of the
financial and banking sectors.
I should note in passing that the advantages of transparency extend well beyond the financial
sector. When policy actions and performance are transparent, policymakers have more incentive
to pursue responsible policies, and the private sector can make more informed investment
decisions. Moreover, markets can more readily distinguish between good performers and
questionable ones, and the risk of contagion is diminished. But transparency also serves a wider
purpose: it diminishes the opportunities for corruption and provides a stronger basis for public
confidence in their leaders and support for their policies, which, after all, is a prerequisite for
continued reform.
The third task is to improve the quality of public expenditure. This means
reducing unproductive expenditure to make more room for investment in human capital and
basic infrastructure. It also means ensuring that essential public services are provided at
reasonable cost, that they reach the intended beneficiaries, and that access to these services is
equitable. Finally, it means prioritizing spending programs, and increasing their cost
effectiveness.
Given the need to increase the rate of sustainable growth and reduce income disparities, it is
essential to improve the composition of expenditure on education, which at present is skewed
toward higher education, and to ensure that children have access to basic health services. This
would have a substantial positive impact on the quality of the workforce, and hence on Latin
America’s long-term growth potential, and prospects for more equitable income
distribution. But none of this can be achieved through higher deficits, which lead to inflation, or
through higher taxes that dampen investment and growth. And none of this can be achieved
unless all taxpayers pay their taxes!
Let me point out that Latin America has the distinction of currently spending less as a share
of GDP on the military than any other region in the world. I sincerely hope that governments will
resist the rising temptation to increase such expenditure—which would be lunacy after all
the effort that has been expended to reduce tensions and promote regional cooperation—and
recognize that these resources would be much better spent if used to improve the productive
capacity of their economies and the skills of their workers. In this connection, let me pay tribute
to the presidents of Latin America and their "Declaracion de Asuncion," in which
they reiterated their decision to keep the region free of arms races.
A fourth task is labor market reform. This is an area in which there has been
relatively less progress throughout the region, which, I believe, has had a dampening effect on
social progress. Many people associate structural reform with higher unemployment and fear that
labor market reform will only make the problem worse. I believe—and there is evidence to
demonstrate—that they are mistaken. Certainly, as industry modernizes and the public
sector reduces over-employment, there will be a short-term cost in terms of jobs lost. But
postponing the adjustment required by these changes exacts a far higher human cost in terms of
reduced growth and future lost jobs. The keys to preserving and expanding employment,
particularly among the less skilled, are a flexible labor market that encourages mobility and keeps
labor costs in line with labor productivity and sustained efforts to improve workers’ skills.
* * * * *
Perhaps you are surprised to hear the Managing Director of the institution at the heart of the
international monetary system discussing issues such as accountability, transparency, justice,
education, labor markets, and so forth. Certainly, my purpose is not to minimize the importance
of monetary rigor or give short shrift to the strong fiscal policies needed to underpin monetary
stability. Prudent monetary and fiscal policies are, in point of fact, essential and inescapable, the
sine qua non for everything else. But they are not by themselves sufficient to accelerate
economic and social progress in the decisive way required to impart to an economy the strength
and resilience needed for it to participate actively and confidently in an open international
economy. To increase the equality of economic opportunity, to attract more long-term
investment, and compete successfully in global markets, broader policy action is required. Of
course, developing economic and financial ties with the rest of the world is also
essential—and makes for good business. But on this there is no need to insist, because so
many in Latin America and elsewhere have already understood.