Fast and furious
The pandemic is accelerating the advancement of technology, which was
already restructuring labor markets. For many, technology has enhanced
efficiency and enabled remote work, but for others, it has disrupted
livelihoods. Automation has clearly destroyed some jobs as robots clean
hospital floors, tollbooth operators vanish, and chatbots replace customer
service agents. Yet digital platforms have also added new and different
jobs to the economy—jobs in software programming, health care,
and—yes—pizza delivery and taxi services.
The key question is this: Whose jobs will vanish and who can access the new
forms of work?
Automation was gaining ground well before COVID-19 hit. This should come as
no surprise, especially in places where new technology triggered structural
transformation through massive employment shifts in the past—first from
farms to factories and then from factories to services.
Where the cost of deploying new technology is low and promises higher
output and faster delivery, companies replace workers with machines—as the
Luddite handloom weavers learned. Automation is gaining ground faster in
developed economies (and in China), where labor costs are relatively high
and companies have capital to spare. But developing economies are certainly
not immune. They may have a surplus of low-cost labor, but that is only one
factor in the overall cost of production.
More companies will automate as the pandemic underscores the
vulnerabilities of a human workforce and geographically dispersed global
supply chains. Some may also “reshore” production by bringing manufacturing
and service jobs back to the United States and Europe—a trend that was
emerging before COVID-19. Developing economies must brace for a triple
shock: increasing labor substitution as domestic companies automate, at
least moderate growth in foreign companies reshoring, and slowing exports
as demand remains low.
The pandemic is also fueling the platform economy. From e-commerce to the
gig economy, consumers are increasingly tapping the internet to connect
with goods and services from the safety of their homes.
The gig economy’s low barriers to entry present new employment
opportunities—and new hazards—for developing economies. The danger is that
the bulging supply of young and low-skilled workers drawn to platforms is
likely to exceed the demand for their services as data processors, customer
service representatives, and ride-hailing service drivers.
Not only will these workers frequently find themselves “gigless”—that is,
underemployed—but they will likely face downward pressure on working
conditions. Evidence from countries where an increasing share of workers
compete on gig platforms confirms that wages are getting squeezed. And the
assumption that most gig workers were previously in poor-quality informal
work doesn’t always hold. A 2015 study by Perkumpulan Prakarsa and the
JustJobs Network surveyed 205 on-demand motorbike taxi drivers working
through the online taxi-hailing applications Gojek and GrabBike. Of the
respondents who were previously employed, 51 percent had been engaged in
the formal economy before joining the gig economy.
COVID-19 is also accelerating trends in distance learning and remote work.
But these developments widen the gap between the haves and the
have-nots—between those who can and cannot afford computers and internet
access and between those who do and don’t have the skills to participate in
a digitally driven economy.