IMF Working Papers

Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises

By Ruud A. de Mooij, Michael Keen, Masanori Orihara

February 25, 2013

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Ruud A. de Mooij, Michael Keen, and Masanori Orihara. Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2013) accessed September 19, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

That most corporate tax systems favor debt over equity finance is now widely recognized as, potentially, amplifying risks to financial stability. This paper makes a first attempt to explore, empirically, the link between this tax bias and the probability of financial crisis. It finds that greater tax bias is associated with significantly higher aggregate bank leverage, and that this in turn is associated with a significantly greater chance of crisis. The implication is that tax bias makes crises much more likely, and, conversely, that the welfare gains from policies to alleviate it can be substantial—far greater than previous studies, which have ignored financial stability considerations, suggest.

Subject: Bank levy, Banking, Banking crises, Corporate income tax, Debt bias, Financial crises, Tax policy, Taxes

Keywords: Bank, Bank assets, Bank characteristic, Bank leverage, Bank leverage ratio, Bank levy, Bank loss, Bank taxation, Banking crises, Corporate income tax, Corporate tax, Debt bias, Leverage, Leverage ratio, Rate, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    26

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2013/048

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2013048

  • ISBN:

    9781475577709

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941