Shifting Sands By Vali Nasr

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A generational shift in geopolitics is creating new possibilities for prosperity in the Greater Middle East.
Author: VALI NASR, Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
Publication: F&D Magazine, September 2023.
Central thesis: With a palpable shift in the US outlook on the Middle East and growing roles for China and Russia, regional actors are increasingly pursuing economic integration and diplomacy in lieu of confrontation.

US strategic realignment:
- Since the 1979 revolution in Iran the United States served as the mainstay of the region’s security architecture.
- US interventions and engagements cited: containment of Iran; containment of Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990; post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; interventions in Libya and Syria.
- US attention has shifted to other global priorities, notably managing China’s rise.
- Result: Washington is no longer keen on entanglement in Middle East conflicts; it continues to seek containment of Iran but not at the cost of direct confrontation.
Regional response:
- In the absence of ironclad American guarantees, regional powers mitigate threats and reduce tensions through diplomacy and greater economic engagement.
- Examples: Abraham Accords (2020); rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia; mending of ties among Gulf states and with Türkiye, Iraq, and Syria.

Economic statecraft:
- Gulf monarchies are investing in Israel, Iraq, and Türkiye; UAE trade with Iran has grown over the past two years; Saudi Arabia has hinted at investing in Iran if relations normalize.
- Economic engagement is both opportunity-driven and a means to build strategic relationships.
Regional infrastructure vision:
- Talk of a trade corridor connecting the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean via roads and railways linking Oman to Saudi Arabia and on to Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Türkiye, with lateral connections to Iran and Israel.
- The United States supports a broader Persian Gulf–Levant-India connection (excluding Iran) to limit China’s role and integrate the Persian Gulf into its Asia strategy.
Expanded economic boundaries:
- Economic and cultural ties now weave Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Horn of Africa, and South Asia into the traditional Middle East and North Africa region.
- India is now the UAE’s largest trading partner.
- China and East Asia play an important part in the region’s ascendant economic vision.

China:
- China is now Saudi Arabia’s largest energy partner; Chinese investments in the kingdom outpace those of all other countries.
- China has invested more than $56 billion in Pakistan as part of its Belt and Road Initiative and is discussing similar investment in Iran.
- For China the Greater Middle East is critical to its vision for Eurasia and to diversify transit corridors away from maritime choke points.
- Beijing contributed to normalizing ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, reinforcing economic interdependence in the region.
Russia:
- Already involved through intervention in Syria and oil-production coordination with Saudi Arabia and OPEC.
- Russia’s war in Ukraine reduced its involvement in Syria but deepened ties with Iran, including Iranian drones and ordnance used in Ukraine.
- Russian trade interest in a transit corridor from Astrakhan (Caspian Sea) through Iran to Chahbahar (Arabian Sea) connects Iran to port cities on the Persian Gulf as part of an emerging Russian trade network.

Europe’s response to Russian aggression will increase dependence on energy imports from North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
Implications for North Africa:
- Algeria and Egypt will be impacted first as gas producers.
- Morocco and Tunisia could benefit from increased integration into Mediterranean supply chains serving Europe.
Pipeline and transit ambitions:
- Türkiye envisages a future as a transit hub for energy pipelines from the south and east to Europe.
- Saudi Arabia and Qatar are contemplating pipelines to route their oil and gas, and Iraq’s, to a Turkish hub.
Preconditions:
- Plans depend on resolution of conflicts along transit routes; economic interest could foster incentives for continued peace.
- Example: November 2022 Israel and Lebanon signed a deal setting maritime borders in the Mediterranean—seen as a prelude to development of their gas fields.

Great power rivalries (US, China, Russia) will continue to shape the Greater Middle East, but current dynamics are aligning to bind countries closer economically rather than wrench them apart.
The region is increasingly imagining economic integration as a solution to persistent security concerns, with a future potentially resembling present-day Southeast Asia in terms of integration.
The United States seeks to replace its old order with infrastructure linking India to the Persian Gulf and Israel through ports, roads, and railways—partly aimed at containment of Iran and China but reinforcing economic ties that reflect the new geopolitical reality.

Shifting Sands — VALI NASR, F&D Magazine, September 2023.

Point of View: Shifting Sands
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