Controlling Fiscal Corruption
August 1, 1997
Download PDF
More Formats on IMF eLibrary
Order a Print CopyDisclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
This paper examines the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. First, a case study of a successful attack on corruption is presented that shows the importance of attending to the conditions of service of fiscal officers. Second, a model is developed drawing on the conclusions of the case study that shows their consistency with optimization behavior. It confirms that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a virtuous circle.
Subject: Bonuses, Civil service, Corruption, Crime, Income and capital gains taxes, Labor, Revenue administration, Tax administration core functions, Tax evasion
Keywords: Bonuses, Civil service, clearance certificate, constituted revenue authority, corruption, Fiscal performance, Ghana, incentives, revenue improvement, Tax administration core functions, tax authority, tax collector, tax collectors choice, tax collectors increase, tax evasion, tax income, tax officer, tax ratio, WP
Pages:
17
Volume:
1997
DOI:
Issue:
100
Series:
Working Paper No. 1997/100
Stock No:
WPIEA1001997
ISBN:
9781451852363
ISSN:
1018-5941
