The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997—A Strategy of Financial Sector Reform
March 1, 1999
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Summary
After years of strong performance, Korea’s economy entered a crisis in 1997, owing largely to structural problems in its financial and corporate sectors. These problems emerged in the second half of that year, when the capital inflows that had helped finance Korea’s growth were reversed, as foreign investors—reeling from losses in other Southeast Asian economies—decided to reduce their exposure to Korea. This paper focuses on the sources of the crisis that originated in the financial sector, the measures taken to deal with it, and the evolution of key banking and financial variables in its aftermath.
Subject: Bank credit, Banking, Commercial banks, Credit, Financial institutions, Loans, Money, Nonperforming loans
Keywords: Bank credit, banking supervision, bond issue, book value, capital adequacy ratio, capital base, Commercial banks, commercial paper, Credit, development bank, East Asia, equity capital, excess reserves, exchange rate, Financial crises, financial system, form bank, HSBC Holdings, Loans, Nonperforming loans, prudential regulations, public funds, short-term debt, Southeast Asia, subordinated debt, WP
Pages:
66
Volume:
1999
DOI:
Issue:
028
Series:
Working Paper No. 1999/028
Stock No:
WPIEA0281999
ISBN:
9781451844641
ISSN:
1018-5941
