Gender

Despite significant progress in recent decades, labor markets across the world remain divided along gender lines. Female labor force participation has remained lower than male participation, gender wage gaps are high, and women are overrepresented in the informal sector and among the poor. In many countries, legal restrictions persist which constrain women from developing their full economic potential. While equality between men and women is in itself an important development goal, women's economic participation is also a part of the growth and stability equation. In rapidly aging economies, higher female labor force participation can boost growth by mitigating the impact of a shrinking workforce. Better opportunities for women can also contribute to broader economic development in developing economies, for instance through higher levels of school enrollment for girls.
In a world of frequent shocks, central bank communications should anchor expectations by explaining how policy responds to changing conditions, rather than committing to a fixed path
Many G20 economies face constraints from excessive labor, product-market, or consumer regulations, an IMF survey shows
Authors probe complex issues to shed light on global economic challenges
After restoring stability, Argentina needs to turn hard-won gains into lasting prosperity
Sustained rebalancing requires policy action in both surplus and deficit countries
Stronger oversight, better data, and deeper coordination are needed to safeguard faster and more interconnected markets
Forward guidance, or forward-looking monetary policy, is an essential part of policymakers’ toolkits, yet there is a need to carefully define its scope. Two forms of such guidance exist with a clear distinction between them: first, explicit commitments about the future path of the monetary policy stance, and second, communication about forecasts and the monetary authority’s reaction- function. Commitments to future rate paths designed for effective lower bound conditions can become costly in an environment marred by supply shocks, as seen during the postpandemic inflation period. It follows that communication about the future path of policy rates should be state dependent and embedded in frameworks organized around clear objectives and risks. More specifically, grounding communication on specific scenarios can help convey how a particular policy mix would adjust as a result of varying combinations of inflation outcomes, demand shortfalls, and indicators of financial stress. Therefore, it is possible to preserve monetary transmission, anchor expectations, and bolster accountability without creating artificially compressed market volatility or unnecessary constraints on future policy. Communicating risks adequately and clearly is key to preserving proper risk-taking incentives of financial institutions.
This paper reports on the Fund’s income position for FY 2026 following the closing of the Fund’s accounts for the financial year and completion of the external audit. Total comprehensive income of the General Department was SDR 4.8 billion (or about US$6.5 billion) comprising General Resources Account (GRA) net income (SDR 1.9 billion), retained investment income (SDR 1 billion) and remeasurement gains reported under IAS 19 (SDR 1.9 billion). GRA net income, after taking into account the placement of SDR 1.38 billion from the General Resources Account (GRA) to the Interim Placement Administered Account (IPAA), increased Fund reserves by about SDR 0.5 billion. Remeasurement gains contributed a further SDR 1.9 billion to reserves. In accordance with decisions taken by the Executive Board in April 2026, the Endowment payout of US$208 million (SDR 151 million) was made to the GRA and a net transfer of currencies equivalent to SDR 0.3 billion will be made from the Fixed-Income Subaccount (FI) of the Investment Account (IA) to the GRA during FY 2027. The Fund’s precautionary balances reached SDR 26.3 billion at the end of FY 2026.
Achieving climate-related commitments and mitigating related risks to macroeconomic and financial stability require improving the conditions for private investment. Raising sufficient private finance is however challenging, particularly for emerging markets and developing economies. This paper develops an analytical framework to assess how reforms shape private climate finance. Key dimensions include macrostructural reforms to lower capital costs, measures to incentivise financing for climate-related investments, and blended financing that leverages public resources to attract private investment. To the extent the resulting externally-financed investments are resilience- and growth-enhancing, these can also support strengthening of the longer-term balance of payments position. Effective implementation may require international support, especially for developing economies
This report presents the findings of the Fiscal Transparency Evaluation conducted for Serbia at the request of the Ministry of Finance. The evaluation assesses Serbia’s fiscal transparency practices against the requirements of the IMF Fiscal Transparency Code. Practices are strongest in the first two pillars of fiscal reporting; and fiscal forecasting and budgeting, while performance in the 3rd pillar of fiscal risk management is weaker, reflecting ongoing reform efforts in this area. The evaluation highlights the need for more comprehensive and timely fiscal reports that better disclose the government’s financial performance. This includes reconciling financing with changes in debt and quantifying tax expenditures. Budget coverage should be expanded to include the remaining extrabudgetary funds, while the effectiveness of medium-term budgeting should be strengthened. More forward-looking analysis of vulnerabilities in public finances would support better-informed decision-making, including around obligations related to public corporations, and long-term pension and health spending pressures.
The paper presents highlights from the FY2026 budget, followed by a discussion of outputs based on the Fund Thematic Categories and of inputs.
I analyze multi-horizon market forecasts for macroeconomic variables in Brazil from 2010 to 2026, using a structural macroeconomic model to interpret stated beliefs as the outcomes of a coherent belief system. This produces time-varying beliefs about policy rules, transmission mechanisms, and structural shocks. Beliefs about the monetary policy rule vary in two distinct dimensions, with the perceived target and Taylor response coefficients showing independent variation. Monetary transmission is seen as weak; the perceived Philips and IS curves are very flat. Markets see fiscal policy as increasingly unresponsive to higher debt. The perceived inflation target is unchanged after an unexpected monetary tightening, but the perceived response to inflation increases, with larger effects for monetary surprises and smaller for news shocks.
We develop standardized time-series measures of shocks and uncertainty for output growth and inflation across 14 Asia-Pacific economies using data from Consensus Economics survey of professional economic forecasters. They are based on changes in mean forecasts and standard deviations, adjusted for intra-year patterns that arise from the annual-average percent changes basis of the data. As an example of how our shock measures may be used, we apply the vector autoregression method of sign restrictions to decompose output growth and inflation shocks into fundamental demand and supply shocks. Those shocks and our uncertainty measures align well with major economic events such as the Asian Financial Crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and geopolitical conflicts. We show that our uncertainty measures most closely reflect the concept of macroeconomic uncertainty, with apparent differences to established economic policy uncertainty measures across all comparable economies, but a close relationship with two well-known macroeconomic uncertainty measures produced only for the United States. Hence, extending the measures of macroeconomic uncertainty to all 14 economies in our analysis, along with the shocks for those economies, creates a valuable dataset for economic policy setting and empirical research.
How do demographic trends shape the adoption of AI and automation technologies? This paper provides the first large-scale cross-country firm-level test of the demographic–automation hypothesis using World Bank Enterprise Surveys data covering 89,380 firms across 144 countries from 2022 to 2025. I classify adopters by applying a large language model to firms’ open-ended process innovation descriptions, identifying 1,656 AI and automation adopters (1.9 percent of the sample). A ten-percentage-point increase in the old-age dependency ratio raises process adoption probability by approximately 0.6 percentage points, after accounting for countries’ income levels, digital infrastructure, firm size and sector, and broad regional and time differences. The result is robust across specifications and supported by an instrumental variable strategy based on predetermined demographic cohort structure. Heterogeneity analysis shows the effect concentrates in manufacturing, large firms, and developing economies for the broad adoption measure; restricting to firms with explicit references to AI reverses the sector pattern, with services firms significantly more likely to adopt than manufacturing firms, pointing to distinct sectoral profiles for software-based AI and hardware-based automation. Aging also predicts firms’ development of AI-enabled products across both manufacturing and services. The results indicate that demographic aging shapes AI and automation adoption through both process and product innovation channels: firms substitute technology for increasingly scarce and costly labor in production, and separately develop AI-enabled products for labor-constrained customers.
Since the transition to inflation targeting (IT) in 2015, the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) has substantially improved its transparency and communication practices. The NBK commitment to transparency is embedded in strategic documents—the 2030 Monetary Policy Strategy, Communication Strategy, and Macroprudential Policy Strategy. Stakeholders consistently acknowledged the NBK as a national leader in promoting transparency, commending its proactive stance on openness, timely dissemination of information, and strong commitment to constructive engagement with the public and institutional partners.
In a world of frequent shocks, central bank communications should anchor expectations by explaining how policy responds to changing conditions, rather than committing to a fixed path
Many G20 economies face constraints from excessive labor, product-market, or consumer regulations, an IMF survey shows
Authors probe complex issues to shed light on global economic challenges
After restoring stability, Argentina needs to turn hard-won gains into lasting prosperity
Sustained rebalancing requires policy action in both surplus and deficit countries
Stronger oversight, better data, and deeper coordination are needed to safeguard faster and more interconnected markets
Forward guidance, or forward-looking monetary policy, is an essential part of policymakers’ toolkits, yet there is a need to carefully define its scope. Two forms of such guidance exist with a clear distinction between them: first, explicit commitments about the future path of the monetary policy stance, and second, communication about forecasts and the monetary authority’s reaction- function. Commitments to future rate paths designed for effective lower bound conditions can become costly in an environment marred by supply shocks, as seen during the postpandemic inflation period. It follows that communication about the future path of policy rates should be state dependent and embedded in frameworks organized around clear objectives and risks. More specifically, grounding communication on specific scenarios can help convey how a particular policy mix would adjust as a result of varying combinations of inflation outcomes, demand shortfalls, and indicators of financial stress. Therefore, it is possible to preserve monetary transmission, anchor expectations, and bolster accountability without creating artificially compressed market volatility or unnecessary constraints on future policy. Communicating risks adequately and clearly is key to preserving proper risk-taking incentives of financial institutions.
This paper reports on the Fund’s income position for FY 2026 following the closing of the Fund’s accounts for the financial year and completion of the external audit. Total comprehensive income of the General Department was SDR 4.8 billion (or about US$6.5 billion) comprising General Resources Account (GRA) net income (SDR 1.9 billion), retained investment income (SDR 1 billion) and remeasurement gains reported under IAS 19 (SDR 1.9 billion). GRA net income, after taking into account the placement of SDR 1.38 billion from the General Resources Account (GRA) to the Interim Placement Administered Account (IPAA), increased Fund reserves by about SDR 0.5 billion. Remeasurement gains contributed a further SDR 1.9 billion to reserves. In accordance with decisions taken by the Executive Board in April 2026, the Endowment payout of US$208 million (SDR 151 million) was made to the GRA and a net transfer of currencies equivalent to SDR 0.3 billion will be made from the Fixed-Income Subaccount (FI) of the Investment Account (IA) to the GRA during FY 2027. The Fund’s precautionary balances reached SDR 26.3 billion at the end of FY 2026.
Achieving climate-related commitments and mitigating related risks to macroeconomic and financial stability require improving the conditions for private investment. Raising sufficient private finance is however challenging, particularly for emerging markets and developing economies. This paper develops an analytical framework to assess how reforms shape private climate finance. Key dimensions include macrostructural reforms to lower capital costs, measures to incentivise financing for climate-related investments, and blended financing that leverages public resources to attract private investment. To the extent the resulting externally-financed investments are resilience- and growth-enhancing, these can also support strengthening of the longer-term balance of payments position. Effective implementation may require international support, especially for developing economies
This report presents the findings of the Fiscal Transparency Evaluation conducted for Serbia at the request of the Ministry of Finance. The evaluation assesses Serbia’s fiscal transparency practices against the requirements of the IMF Fiscal Transparency Code. Practices are strongest in the first two pillars of fiscal reporting; and fiscal forecasting and budgeting, while performance in the 3rd pillar of fiscal risk management is weaker, reflecting ongoing reform efforts in this area. The evaluation highlights the need for more comprehensive and timely fiscal reports that better disclose the government’s financial performance. This includes reconciling financing with changes in debt and quantifying tax expenditures. Budget coverage should be expanded to include the remaining extrabudgetary funds, while the effectiveness of medium-term budgeting should be strengthened. More forward-looking analysis of vulnerabilities in public finances would support better-informed decision-making, including around obligations related to public corporations, and long-term pension and health spending pressures.
The paper presents highlights from the FY2026 budget, followed by a discussion of outputs based on the Fund Thematic Categories and of inputs.
I analyze multi-horizon market forecasts for macroeconomic variables in Brazil from 2010 to 2026, using a structural macroeconomic model to interpret stated beliefs as the outcomes of a coherent belief system. This produces time-varying beliefs about policy rules, transmission mechanisms, and structural shocks. Beliefs about the monetary policy rule vary in two distinct dimensions, with the perceived target and Taylor response coefficients showing independent variation. Monetary transmission is seen as weak; the perceived Philips and IS curves are very flat. Markets see fiscal policy as increasingly unresponsive to higher debt. The perceived inflation target is unchanged after an unexpected monetary tightening, but the perceived response to inflation increases, with larger effects for monetary surprises and smaller for news shocks.
We develop standardized time-series measures of shocks and uncertainty for output growth and inflation across 14 Asia-Pacific economies using data from Consensus Economics survey of professional economic forecasters. They are based on changes in mean forecasts and standard deviations, adjusted for intra-year patterns that arise from the annual-average percent changes basis of the data. As an example of how our shock measures may be used, we apply the vector autoregression method of sign restrictions to decompose output growth and inflation shocks into fundamental demand and supply shocks. Those shocks and our uncertainty measures align well with major economic events such as the Asian Financial Crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and geopolitical conflicts. We show that our uncertainty measures most closely reflect the concept of macroeconomic uncertainty, with apparent differences to established economic policy uncertainty measures across all comparable economies, but a close relationship with two well-known macroeconomic uncertainty measures produced only for the United States. Hence, extending the measures of macroeconomic uncertainty to all 14 economies in our analysis, along with the shocks for those economies, creates a valuable dataset for economic policy setting and empirical research.
How do demographic trends shape the adoption of AI and automation technologies? This paper provides the first large-scale cross-country firm-level test of the demographic–automation hypothesis using World Bank Enterprise Surveys data covering 89,380 firms across 144 countries from 2022 to 2025. I classify adopters by applying a large language model to firms’ open-ended process innovation descriptions, identifying 1,656 AI and automation adopters (1.9 percent of the sample). A ten-percentage-point increase in the old-age dependency ratio raises process adoption probability by approximately 0.6 percentage points, after accounting for countries’ income levels, digital infrastructure, firm size and sector, and broad regional and time differences. The result is robust across specifications and supported by an instrumental variable strategy based on predetermined demographic cohort structure. Heterogeneity analysis shows the effect concentrates in manufacturing, large firms, and developing economies for the broad adoption measure; restricting to firms with explicit references to AI reverses the sector pattern, with services firms significantly more likely to adopt than manufacturing firms, pointing to distinct sectoral profiles for software-based AI and hardware-based automation. Aging also predicts firms’ development of AI-enabled products across both manufacturing and services. The results indicate that demographic aging shapes AI and automation adoption through both process and product innovation channels: firms substitute technology for increasingly scarce and costly labor in production, and separately develop AI-enabled products for labor-constrained customers.
Since the transition to inflation targeting (IT) in 2015, the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) has substantially improved its transparency and communication practices. The NBK commitment to transparency is embedded in strategic documents—the 2030 Monetary Policy Strategy, Communication Strategy, and Macroprudential Policy Strategy. Stakeholders consistently acknowledged the NBK as a national leader in promoting transparency, commending its proactive stance on openness, timely dissemination of information, and strong commitment to constructive engagement with the public and institutional partners.