Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?

Publication Date:

June 1, 1997

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.

Series:

Working Paper No. 1997/073

Subject:

Civil service Corruption Crime Income Labor National accounts Public sector wages Wages

English

Publication Date:

June 1, 1997

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451849424/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0731997

Pages:

56

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