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World Economic Outlook
World Economic Outlook, October 2017<br>Seeking Sustainable Growth:<br> <small>Short-Term Recovery, Long-Term Challenges</small>
October 2017
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October 2017
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The global upswing in economic activity is strengthening, with global growth projected to rise to 3.6 percent in 2017 and 3.7 percent in 2018. Broad-based upward revisions in the euro area, Japan, emerging Asia, emerging Europe, and Russia more than offset downward revisions for the United States and the United Kingdom. But the recovery is not complete: while the baseline outlook is strengthening, growth remains weak in many countries, and inflation is below target in most advanced economies. Commodity exporters, especially of fuel, are particularly hard hit as their adjustment to a sharp stepdown in foreign earnings continues. And while short-term risks are broadly balanced, medium-term risks are still tilted to the downside. For policymakers, the welcome cyclical pickup in global activity provides an ideal window of opportunity to tackle key challenges—namely to boost potential output while ensuring its benefits are broadly shared, and to build resilience against downside risks.
The earlier projected increase in growth is strengthening. Notable pickups in investment, trade, and industrial production, coupled with stronger business and consumer confidence, are supporting the recovery. With early 2017 growth generally stronger than expected, upward revisions to projections are broad based, including for the euro area, Japan, China, emerging Europe, and Russia, more than offsetting downward revisions for the United States, the United Kingdom, and India. After disappointing global growth over the past few years, this recent pickup provides an ideal window of opportunity for policymakers to undertake critical reforms to stave off downside risks, raise potential output, and improve living standards more broadly.
Full Text of Chapter 1 Blog| Tables |
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| Chart | Data | 1.1 | Global Activity Indicators |
| Chart | Data | 1.2 | Global Fixed Investment and Trade |
| Chart | Data | 1.3 | Commodity Prices |
| Chart | Data | 1.4 | Global Inflation |
| Chart | Data | 1.5 | Advanced Economies: Monetary and Financial Market Conditions |
| Chart | Data | 1.6 | Real Effective Exchange Rate Changes, November 2016–September 2017 |
| Chart | Data | 1.7 | Emerging Market Economies: Equity Markets and Credit |
| Chart | Data | 1.8 | Emerging Market Economies: Interest Rates |
| Chart | Data | 1.9 | Emerging Market Economies: Capital Flows |
| Chart | Data | 1.10 | Revisions to 2017 Growth and 2016 Output Gaps |
| Chart | Data | 1.11 | Emerging Markets: Terms-of-Trade Windfall Gains and Losses |
| Chart | Data | 1.12 | GDP Growth, 1999–2022 |
| Chart | Data | 1.13 | Fiscal Indicators |
| Chart | Data | 1.14 | Global Current Account Balances |
| Chart | Data | 1.15 | Real Exchange Rates and Current Account Balances in Relation to Economic Fundamentals |
| Chart | Data | 1.16 | Net International Investment Positions |
| Chart | Data | 1.17 | Geopolitical Risk Index |
| Chart | Data | 1.18 | Risks to the Global Outlook |
| Chart | Data | 1.19 | Recession and Deflation Risks |
| Chart | Data | 1.20 | Advanced Economy Output Gaps, 2017 |
| Chart | Data | 1.21 | Emerging Market and Developing Economy Output Gaps, 2017 |
| Chart | Data | 1.22 | Per Capita Real GDP Growth across Low-Income Developing Countries |
| Chart | Data | Scen. Fig. 1 | Group of Twenty Macro Scenario |
| Chart | Data | 1.1.1 | Population Shares by Age Group and Gender |
| Chart | Data | 1.1.2 | Labor Force Participation Rates by Age Group and Gender |
| Chart | Data | 1.1.3 | Decomposition of Change in Labor Force Participation Rate, 2017–16 |
| Chart | Data | 1.1.4 | Changes in Labor Force Participation, Select Advanced Economies, 2007–16 |
| Chart | Data | 1.1.5 | Changes in Labor Force Participation Rates for the 25–54 Age Group by Gender, Select Advanced Economies |
| Chart | Data | 1.1.6 | Convergence in Female Labor Force Participation Rates |
| Chart | Data | 1.2.1 | Capital Flows to Emerging Market and Developing Economies |
| Chart | Data | 1.2.2 | China: Reserves and Capital Flows |
| Chart | Data | 1.2.3 | Latest Capital Flows Trends and Prospects |
| Chart | Data | 1.3.1 | Per Capita Real GDP Growth across Country Groups |
| Chart | Data | 1.3.2 | Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Emerging Market and Developing Economies, by Region |
| Chart | Data | 1.3.3 | EMDEs' per Capita Real GDP Growth Differentials vis-à-vis Advanced Economies: 1995–2016 versus 2017–22 |
| Chart | Data | 1.3.4 | Distribution of EMDE per Capita Real GDP Growth Differentials with Respect to Advanced Economies |
| Chart | Data | 1.3.5 | Distribution of EMDE per Capita Real GDP Growth Differentials with Respect to Advanced Economies, by Type of Export Earnings and Region |
| Chart | Data | 1.3.6 | Distribution of EMDE Population by per Capita Real GDP Growth Rate |
| Chart | Data | 1.3.7 | Projected per Capita Real GDP Growth Rates and 2011 Real Income Levels, AEs and EMDEs |
| Chart | Data | 1.4.1 | Commodity Prices |
| Chart | Data | 1.4.2 | Exchange Rate Regimes of Commodity-Exporting Emerging Market and Developing Economies |
| Chart | Data | 1.4.3 | Commodity Terms of Trade |
| Chart | Data | 1.4.4 | Evolution of Exchange Rates |
| Chart | Data | 1.4.5 | Net Export Adjustment, 2013–16 |
| Chart | Data | 1.4.6 | Fiscal Indicators |
| Chart | Data | 1.4.7 | Change in per Capita GDP Growth and Inflation in Fuel Exporters, Conditional on CToT |
| Chart | Data | 1.5.1 | Net Remittances as a Share of Output, 2015 |
| Chart | Data | 1.5.2 | Financial Integration |
| Chart | Data | 1.5.3 | Smoothing Effects of Remittances |
| Chart | Data | 1.5.4 | Contribution of Remittances to Consumption Risk Sharing |
| Chart | Data | 1.SF.1 | Commodity Market Developments |
Nominal wage growth in most advanced economies remains markedly lower than it was before the Great Recession of 2008–09. This chapter finds that the bulk of the wage slowdown can be explained by labor market slack, inflation expectations, and trend productivity growth. While involuntary part-time employment may have helped support labor force participation and facilitated stronger engagement with the workplace, it also appears to have weakened wage growth. This is the case even in economies where measured slack appears low.
Full Text of Chapter 2 Blog| Tables |
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| Chart | Data | 2.1 | Distribution of Labor Market Indicators |
| Chart | Data | 2.2 | Distribution of Nominal Wage Growth and Correlation with Changes in the Unemployment Rate |
| Chart | Data | 2.3 | Job Attributes: Involuntary Part-Time Employment |
| Chart | Data | 2.4 | Job Attributes: Temporary Contracts |
| Chart | Data | 2.5 | Job Attributes: Hours per Worker |
| Chart | Data | 2.6 | Changes in Nominal Wage Growth, Actual versus Imputed Using 2008 Sectoral Employment Shares |
| Chart | Data | 2.7 | Changes in Labor Market Indicators, Actual versus Imputed Using 2008 Sectoral Employment Shares |
| Chart | Data | 2.8 | Job Attributes and Changes in Sectoral Employment Shares, 2008–16 |
| Chart | Data | 2.9 | Effects on Growth of Compensation per Hour: Panel Estimation |
| Chart | Data | 2.10 | Effects on Growth of Compensation per Hour: Country-by-Country Estimation, Cross-Country Dispersion |
| Chart | Data | 2.11 | Effects of Involuntary Part-Time Employment on Growth of Compensation per Hour, 2000–16 |
| Chart | Data | 2.12 | Decomposition of Wage Dynamics, 2000–16 |
| Chart | Data | 2.13 | Year Fixed Effects and Common Drivers, 2000–16 |
| Chart | Data | 2.14 | Changes in Growth Expectations and Labor Market Institutions |
| Chart | Data | 2.15 | Long-Term Drivers of Labor Market Dynamics |
| Chart | Data | 2.16 | Effects on Involuntary Part-Time Employment Share, Aggregate Analysis |
| Chart | Data | 2.1.1 | Evolution of Skill Premiums in the United States |
| Chart | Data | 2.1.2 | Skill Premiums and Changes in Skill Premiums in European Economies |
| Chart | Data | 2.1.3 | Nominal Wage Growth by Sector and Skill Group |
| Chart | Data | 2.1.4 | Employment Shares by Skill |
| Chart | Data | 2.1.5 | Employment Shares by Skill and Changes in Hours per Worker |
| Chart | Data | 2.2.1 | Changes in Employment Shares |
| Chart | Data | 2.2.2 | Changes in Employment Shares, 2007–14 |
| Chart | Data | 2.2.3 | Wage Cuts and Freezes, 2014 |
| Chart | Data | 2.3.1 | Estimated Nominal Wage Growth and Employment Growth Differences based on Uncertainty and Growth Expectations |
| Chart | Data | 2.3.2 | Wage and Employment Growth by Debt Maturity in 2008 |
| Chart | Data | Annex 2.2.1 | Distribution of Real Compensation Growth Measures |
| Chart | Data | Annex 2.2.2 | Growth of Real Compensation per Hour and Unemployment Rates |
| Chart | Data | Annnex | 2.2.3. Factors Associated with Nominal Wage Growth |
| Chart | Data | Annex 2.2.4 | Effects of Involuntary Part-Time Employment on Compensation and Wages, 2000–16 |
| Chart | Data | Annex 2.2.5 | Correlations between Aggregate Wage Growth and Two-Quarter-Lagged Public Wage Growth |
| Chart | Data | Annex 2.3.1 | Decomposition of Wage Dynamics, 2000–16 |
| Chart | Data | Annex 2.3.2 | Decomposition of Sectoral Wage Dynamics, 2000–15 |
| Chart | Data | Annex 2.3.3 | Effects on Part-Time Employment Share, Sectoral Analysis |
Global temperatures have increased at an unprecedented pace over the past 40 years, and significant further warming could occur, depending on our ability to restrain greenhouse gas emissions. This chapter finds that increases in temperature have uneven macroeconomic effects, with adverse consequences concentrated in countries with relatively hot climates, such as most low-income countries. In these countries, a rise in temperature lowers per capita output, in both the short and medium term. Sound domestic policies and development alongside investment in adaptation strategies could help to some extent, but given the constraints faced by low-income countries, the international community must play a key role in supporting these countries’ efforts to cope with climate change.
Full Text of Chapter 3 Blog| Tables |
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| Chart | Data | 3.1 | Average Global Temperature |
| Chart | Data | 3.2 | Increase in Average Global Temperature and Contributions of Key Factors |
| Chart | Data | 3.3 | Temperature and Precipitation across Broad Country Groups |
| Chart | Data | 3.4 | Annual CO2 Emissions across Broad Country Groups |
| Chart | -- | 3.5 | Temperature and Precipitation Projections under the RCP 8.5 Scenario |
| Chart | Data | 3.6 | Natural Disasters: Historical and Projected Monthly Probability of Occurrence |
| Chart | Data | 3.7 | Effect of Temperature Increase on Real per Capita Output |
| Chart | Data | 3.8 | Effect of Temperature Increase on Real per Capita Output across the Globe |
| Chart | Data | 3.9 | Effect of Temperature Increase on Sectoral Output Estimated at the Temperature of the Median Low-Income Developing Country |
| Chart | Data | 3.10 | Effect of Temperature Increase on Productivity, Capital, and Labor Input Estimated at the Temperature of the Median Low-Income Developing Country |
| Chart | Data | 3.11 | Effect of Temperature Increase on Real per Capita Output Estimated at the Temperature of the Median Low-Income Developing Country over Time |
| Chart | -- | 3.12 | Coping with Weather Shocks and Climate Change: A Toolkit |
| Chart | Data | 3.13 | The Role of Policy Buffers |
| Chart | Data | 3.14 | The Role of Structural Policies and Institutions |
| Chart | Data | 3.15 | The Role of Development: Evidence from Subnational Data |
| Chart | Data | 3.16 | Effect of Temperature and Natural Disasters on International Migration |
| Chart | Data | 3.17 | Long-Term Impact of Temperature Increase for a Representative Low-Income Developing Country: Model Simulations |
| Chart | Data | 3.18 | Vulnerability to Temperature Increase and Adaptation Prospects |
| Chart | Data | 3.1.1 | Effect of Tropical Cyclone Exposure on Real GDP per Capita |
| Chart | Data | 3.1.2 | Cumulative Effect of Average Tropical Cyclone on Real GDP per Capita after Seven Years |
| Chart | Data | 3.2.1 | The Role of Policies: A Model-Based Analysis |
| Chart | Data | 3.4.1 | Insurance Penetration: Non-Life Insurance Premium |
| Chart | Data | 3.4.2 | Catastrophe Bond Market |
| Chart | Data | 3.4.3 | Temperature Shocks and Stock Price Predictability: Food and Beverages Sector |
| Chart | Data | 3.6.1 | Effectiveness of Mitigation Policies in China |
| Chart | Data | Annex 3.3.1 | Effect of Temperature Increase on Real per Capita Output across the Globe, with Countries Rescaled in Proportion to Their Projected Population as of 2100 |
| Chart | -- | Annex 3.6.1 | The Long-Term Impact of Temperature Increase on Real per Capita Output across the Globe |
Positive cross-country spillovers from collective fiscal action by the world’s largest economies helped speed the recovery from the global financial crisis nearly a decade ago. But fiscal spillovers still matter today and depend on circumstances in both the countries that generate and receive fiscal shocks. This chapter’s new research shows that fiscal spillovers tend to be low when a shock originates from a country without output gaps. But the impact intensifies when a source or recipient country is in recession and/or benefiting from accommodative monetary policy, suggesting that spillovers are large when domestic multipliers are also large.
Full Text of Chapter 4 Blog| Tables |
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| Chart | Data | 4.1 | Output Gap in Selected Countries |
| Chart | -- | 4.2 | The Transmission of a Fiscal Shock |
| Chart | Data | 4.3 | Tracking Tax Shocks in the United States |
| Chart | Data | 4.4 | Dynamic Responses of Recipient Countries’ Output to Fiscal Shocks |
| Chart | Data | 4.5 | Spillovers of Fiscal Shocks on Recipient Countries’ Output |
| Chart | Data | 4.6 | Dynamic Responses of Components of Recipient Countries’ Output to a Fiscal Shock |
| Chart | Data | 4.7 | Spillovers under Various Economic and Policy Conditions |
| Chart | Data | 4.8 | Dynamic Responses of Components of Recipient Countries’ Output under Normal Times and Effective Lower Bound in Recipient Countries |
| Chart | Data | 4.9 | Dynamic Responses of Recipient Countries’ Output to US Spending Shock under Various Exchange Rate Regimes |
| Chart | Data | 4.10 | Impact of Fiscal Shocks on Global GDP Based on Various Instruments |
| Chart | Data | 4.11 | Spillovers from US Fiscal Shocks with and without Monetary Accommodation |
| Chart | Data | 4.12 | Regional GDP Impact of Government Spending Shocks from the United States, Europe, and China |
| Chart | Data | 4.13 | Dynamic Responses to a US Government Spending Shock |
| Chart | Data | 4.14 | Spillovers from US Spending Shock with and without a US Term-Premium Increase |
| Chart | Data | 4.15 | Spillovers from Corporate Income Tax Reduction Financed by an Offsetting Increase in Value-Added Tax |
| Chart | Data | 4.16 | Spillovers from Increase in Government Investment in Five Major Economies |
| Chart | Data | 4.1.1 | Response of Recipient Countries’ Trade Balance and Real Exchange Rate vis-à-vis US Dollar |
| Chart | Data | Annex 4.3.1 | Effects of Spending and Tax Shock on Recipient Countries’ Output: Comparison with Panel Vector Autoregression |
| Chart | Data | Annex 4.3.2 | Effects of Spending and Tax Shock on Recipient Countries’ Output: Forecast Errors |
| Chart | Data | Annex 4.3.3 | Effects of US Tax Shock on Recipient Countries’ Output: Comparison with US Narrative Tax Shock, 1995–2007 |
| List of Tables - Part A (Download PDF) |
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| List of Tables Part B (Download PDF Online only) |
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