Banking Competition, Risk, and Regulation

Author/Editor:

Alexander F. Tieman ; Wilko Bolt

Publication Date:

January 1, 2004

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

In a dynamic theoretical framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, taking regulatory requirements into account. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade-off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per period profits, and a deterioration of the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behavior. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though holding equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2004/011

Subject:

Bank credit Banking Capital adequacy requirements Loans Stocks

English

Publication Date:

January 1, 2004

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451842814/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0112004

Pages:

26

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