IMF Working Papers

Banking Competition, Risk, and Regulation

By Alexander F. Tieman, Wilko Bolt

January 1, 2004

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Alexander F. Tieman, and Wilko Bolt. Banking Competition, Risk, and Regulation, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2004) accessed September 18, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

In a dynamic theoretical framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, taking regulatory requirements into account. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade-off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per period profits, and a deterioration of the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behavior. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though holding equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.

Subject: Bank credit, Banking, Capital adequacy requirements, Loans, Stocks

Keywords: Capital adequacy ratio, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    26

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2004/011

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA0112004

  • ISBN:

    9781451842814

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941