Districting and Government Overspending

Author/Editor:

Reza Baqir

Publication Date:

August 1, 2001

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

The common-pool problem is a central issue in the relationship between the political structure of jurisdictions and the size of public spending. Models predict that, other things being equal, greater political districting of a jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents new evidence on this and related predictions from a cross-section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that one additional legislator is associated, on average, with 3 percent larger expenditures per capita. Evidence also suggests that forms of government with strong executives, particularly those with veto powers, break the link between districting and government size.

Series:

Working Paper No. 01/96

Subject:

Frequency:

Annually

English

Publication Date:

August 1, 2001

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451851915/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0962001

Format:

Paper

Pages:

48

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