Districting and Government Overspending
August 1, 2001
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Summary
The common-pool problem is a central issue in the relationship between the political structure of jurisdictions and the size of public spending. Models predict that, other things being equal, greater political districting of a jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents new evidence on this and related predictions from a cross-section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that one additional legislator is associated, on average, with 3 percent larger expenditures per capita. Evidence also suggests that forms of government with strong executives, particularly those with veto powers, break the link between districting and government size.
Subject: Expenditure, Income, Income inequality, Labor, National accounts, Personal income, Population and demographics, Public employment
Keywords: city government, city government structure, comparative politics, electoral systems, fiscal institutions, form of government, government employment regression, government expenditure, government program, government scale, government size, government spending, Income, Income inequality, manger-council forms of government, mayor-council forms of government entail, Personal income, Public employment, scale of government, State decentralization, WP
Pages:
48
Volume:
2001
DOI:
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Issue:
096
Series:
Working Paper No. 2001/096
Stock No:
WPIEA0962001
ISBN:
9781451851915
ISSN:
1018-5941
