Injury Investigations in anti-Dumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation

Author/Editor:

Poonam Gupta ; Arvind Panagariya

Publication Date:

August 1, 2001

Electronic Access:

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Summary:

Empirical evidence shows that injury investigations in anti-dumping cases conducted by the United States International Trade Commission, the probability of a positive finding is higher when the number of defendant firms is larger, holding constant their total market share. In this paper we offer a theoretical explanation of this finding. We show that the presence of many exporters exacerbates the free-rider problem, which leads every firm to invest less on defense. Thus for the same market share, injury finding is more likely to be positive for many small sellers than a few large sellers.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2001/110

Subject:

Antidumping Exports Imports International trade Protectionism Tariffs Taxes

English

Publication Date:

August 1, 2001

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451853346/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA1102001

Pages:

13

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