Bankers Without Borders? Implications of Ring-Fencing for European Cross-Border Banks
IMF Working Papers, November 1, 2010
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Yuliya Makarova, Anna Ilyina, Christian Schmieder, Eugenio M Cerutti
- Published: November 1, 2010
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781455209477.001
Overview
- Paper presents a stylized analysis of the effects of ring-fencing (i.e., different restrictions on cross-border transfers of excess profits and/or capital between a parent bank and its subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions) on cross-border banks.
- Focus: 25 large European banking groups with subsidiaries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe (CESE).
- Main question: Impact of a CESE credit shock on capital buffers needed by the sample banking groups under different forms of ring-fencing.
- Core result: Under stricter forms of ring-fencing, sample banking groups have substantially larger needs for capital buffers at the parent and/or subsidiary level than under less strict (or in the absence of any) ring-fencing.
Methodology
- Sample: 25 large European banking groups with subsidiaries in CESE.
- Shock scenario: CESE credit shock (stylized simulation).
- Comparative analysis: Simulations under different forms of ring-fencing (ranging from less strict to stricter restrictions on transfers of excess profits and/or capital between parent and subsidiaries).
Key Findings
- Stricter ring-fencing increases capital buffer requirements:
- Sample banking groups require substantially larger capital buffers at the parent and/or subsidiary level under stricter ring-fencing compared with less strict or no ring-fencing.
- Implicit trade-off identified between local protection via ring-fencing and group-level capital flexibility:
- Tighter restrictions on cross-border transfers of profits and capital reduce the ability of the group to absorb localized shocks without additional capital at multiple levels.
Policy Implications and Considerations
- Policymakers and regulators should consider the cross-border implications of ring-fencing rules:
- Stricter ring-fencing can lead to higher aggregate capital needs for banking groups operating across jurisdictions.
- Design of ring-fencing regimes involves balancing host-jurisdiction protection objectives against potential increases in capital requirements and reduced group-level shock absorption capacity.
- Supervisory coordination and capital planning across jurisdictions may mitigate some adverse effects of ring-fencing.