Fiscal Surveillance in a Petro Zone: The Case of the CEMAC
January 1, 2004
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
This paper discusses fiscal surveillance criteria for the countries of the Central African Monetary and Economic Union (CEMAC), most of which depend heavily on oil exports. At present, the CEMAC's macroeconomic surveillance exercise sets as fiscal target a floor on the basic budgetary balance. This appears inadequate, for at least two reasons. First, fluctuations in oil prices and, hence, oil receipts obscure the underlying fiscal stance. Second, oil resources are limited, which suggests that some of today's oil receipts should be saved to finance future consumption. The paper develops easy-to-calculate indicators that take both aspects into account. A retrospective analysis based on these alternative indicators reveals that in recent years, the CEMAC's surveillance exercise has tended to accommodate stances of fiscal policy that are at odds with sound management of oil wealth.
Subject: Commodities, Fiscal policy, Fiscal stance, Oil, Oil prices, Oil production, Oil, gas and mining taxes, Prices, Production, Taxes
Keywords: CFA franc, collection pattern, Fiscal policy, Fiscal stance, gas and mining taxes, Global, macroeconomic surveillance, oil, Oil, oil GDP, Oil prices, Oil production, oil receipts, oil wealth, revenue collection ratio, revenue volatility, U.S. dollar, volatility in the datum, WP
Pages:
26
Volume:
2004
DOI:
Issue:
008
Series:
Working Paper No. 2004/008
Stock No:
WPIEA0082004
ISBN:
9781451842548
ISSN:
1018-5941
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