Smuggling, Currency Substitution and Unofficial Dollarization: A Crime-Theoretic Approach
October 1, 2000
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
Large stocks of U.S. dollars and other hard currencies circulate in the transition economies, in Latin America, and in other countries that have experienced macroeconomic mismanagement. Using a monetary model that combines the legal restrictions and crime-theoretic traditions, this paper demonstrates how leaky exchange controls lead to currency substitution and progressive dollarization. The paper also analyzes the impact of dollarization on the ability of governments to earn seigniorage, the dynamics of dollarization in a growing economy, and the central role of expectations—specifically, confidence in the domestic currency—in determining the extent of dollarization and, potentially, in reversing it.
Subject: Anti-smuggling, Currencies, Currency markets, Dollarization, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Monetary policy, Money, Revenue administration, Stocks
Keywords: Anti-smuggling, Currencies, currency balance, Currency markets, Currency Substitution, Dollarization, Europe, export proceeds, fiat currency, foreign currency, hard currency, hard currency stock, home-country currency market, law of motion, Middle East, Seigniorage, Smuggling, Stocks, WP
Pages:
44
Volume:
2000
DOI:
Issue:
176
Series:
Working Paper No. 2000/176
Stock No:
WPIEA1762000
ISBN:
9781451858808
ISSN:
1018-5941







