Why Do Firms Pay Antidumping Duty?

December 1, 1999

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Poonam Gupta. Why Do Firms Pay Antidumping Duty?, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 1999) accessed September 18, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

With the virtual elimination of tariffs and quotas under GATT, antidumping measures emerged as a key instrument of protection. Under antidumping actions exporters can either raise the price to eliminate the dumping margin or pay an antidumping duty. This paper analyzes the incentives to exporters to choose between duty or settlement outcomes and finds that due to the smaller loss in market share exporters may prefer an antidumping duty over voluntary settlement. The paper analyzes the welfare implications of these outcomes and finds that they are ambiguous.

Subject: Antidumping, Duties, Economic sectors, Foreign corporations, Inflation, International trade, Prices, Taxes, Trade liberalization

Keywords: Antidumping, Antidumping duty, Cost parameter, Dumping margin, Duties, Foreign corporations, Foreign firm, Home firm, Inflation, Monopoly power, Price negotiation, Profit function, Trade liberalization, Welfare effect, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

24
Volume:

---
DOI:

---
Issue:

---
Series:

Working Paper No. 1999/166
Stock No:

WPIEA1661999
ISBN:

9781451858082
ISSN:

1018-5941

FACTSHEETS

RESOURCES

TOPICS

Flagship Publications

Other Publications

IMF reports and publications by country

Regional Offices

All News

See Also

For Journalists

Press Center

RESOURCES

FLAGSHIPS

KEY SERIES

IMF NOTES

IMF Working Papers