Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk Taking
IMF Working Papers, December 1, 2010
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez, Luc Laeven
- Published: December 1, 2010
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781455210831.001
Summary
- The paper provides a theoretical foundation for the claim that prolonged periods of easy monetary conditions increase bank risk taking.
- The net effect of a monetary policy change on bank monitoring (an inverse measure of risk taking) depends on the balance of three forces: interest rate pass-through, risk shifting, and leverage.
- When banks can adjust their capital structures, a monetary easing leads to greater leverage and lower monitoring.
- If a bank's capital structure is fixed, the response to a policy rate cut depends on bank capitalization:
- Well capitalized banks decrease monitoring.
- Highly levered banks increase monitoring.
- The balance of these effects depends on the structure and contestability of the banking industry and therefore is likely to vary across countries and over time.
Mechanisms and Channels
- Interest rate pass-through:
- A change in policy rates affects banks via the degree to which market interest rates and lending rates adjust.
- Risk shifting:
- Banks adjust risk-taking incentives in response to changes in policy rates.
- Leverage:
- Allowing banks to adjust capital structures amplifies the effect of monetary easing by increasing leverage and reducing monitoring.
Key Findings
- Prolonged easy monetary conditions can increase bank risk taking.
- The direction and magnitude of banks' monitoring responses to monetary policy depend on:
- Whether banks can change capital structures.
- Banks' initial capitalization (well capitalized vs. highly levered).
- Banking industry structure and contestability across countries and over time.
Policy Implications
- Monetary easing can have heterogeneous effects on bank risk-taking depending on bank capitalization and capital structure flexibility.
- Supervisory and macroprudential frameworks should consider:
- The interaction between monetary policy and banks' capital structure dynamics.
- Variation in banking market structure and contestability across jurisdictions.