IMF Working Papers

Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk Taking

By Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez, Luc Laeven

December 1, 2010

Download PDF

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez, and Luc Laeven. Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk Taking, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2010) accessed November 8, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

We provide a theoretical foundation for the claim that prolonged periods of easy monetary conditions increase bank risk taking. The net effect of a monetary policy change on bank monitoring (an inverse measure of risk taking) depends on the balance of three forces: interest rate pass-through, risk shifting, and leverage. When banks can adjust their capital structures, a monetary easing leads to greater leverage and lower monitoring. However, if a bank's capital structure is fixed, the balance depends on the degree of bank capitalization: when facing a policy rate cut, well capitalized banks decrease monitoring, while highly levered banks increase it. Further, the balance of these effects depends on the structure and contestability of the banking industry, and is therefore likely to vary across countries and over time.

Subject: Bank credit, Banking, Capital adequacy requirements, Central bank policy rate, Loans

Keywords: Agency problem, Capital structure, Interest rate, Monetary policy, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    36

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2010/276

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2010276

  • ISBN:

    9781455210831

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941